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ABSTRACT 
Technology, as a form of knowledge, can be an important explanatory 
variable in empirical sociological investigations. In this thesis the macro-
historical concept of technology within the discipline of sociology is traced and 
critiqued, with special attention given to analytical misconceptions and 
reifications, e.g., confusing technology with its processes, products, and social 
consequences. An analytical model is initially presented which attempts to 
facilitate a better understanding of the dialectical interrelationships between 
technological, social, and natural (scientific) phenomena. Recent attempts to 
measure the effects of technology on social relationships are critiqued, 
particularly in their inadequate conceptualization and operationalization, 
confusion of cause and effect, lack of generalizability, and failure to empirically 
address technology's explanatory power. It is hypothesized that by knowing 
whether a person reifies technology (i.e., views it as an external autonomous 
force instead of a humanly constructed and maintained body of knowledge) 
one can more accurately predict whether a person finds technology 
uncontrollable or problematic throughout various dimensions of his or her 
social and psychological experience. Finally, a proposal for research is 
presented which could be used to empirically test this hypothesis based on 
statistical analyses of data obtained from a national random-sample mail 
survey. 
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INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Background Information 
1 
Technology permeates every aspect of our lives but is often 
misunderstood, taken-for-granted, or else goes relatively unnoticed. When 
technology becomes the subject of discourse we typically hear statements 
such as "technology is the answer to all our problems" or, on the other hand, 
that technology is the ultimate "source of all our problems." Jay Weinstein, one 
of the few academicians addressing the specific interrelationships of 
technological and sociological knowledge, asserted that such a dichotomy of 
opinion has typified attitudes about technology since the advent of modernity 
and the subsequential birth of the natural and social sciences (Weinstein, 
1982). However, both these views (the answer to problems vs. the source of 
problems) are reifications of the larger social phenomenon of technology. 
"Technology" is best defined as follows: 
[The term] technology refers primarily to a system of knowledge 
intended to have practical bearing-know-how. It is knowledge 
designed to extend the capabilities of humans in dealing with their 
environment, to overcome constitutional and environmental 
limitations. . . . [In] using technology to refer specifically to a type of 
knowledge, it can be kept distinct from several closely related [yet 
different] things to which the term has also been applied: machinery, 
inventions, techniques [processes], and engineering. (Weinstein, 1982, 
pp. xi-xii) 
As part of a larger social dialectic, technology is first and foremost a form of 
knowledge, i.e., 11know-how. 11 As with other forms of knowledge, technology 
can become reified (i.e., removed) from its origins as a humanly constructed 
and maintained body of knowledge and subsequently be seen as a 'thing in 
itself. 11 An example of this reification of technology is the tendency for some 
writers (e.g. Ogburn & Nimkoff, 1955} to refer to technology solely in the 
context of machines and/or processes without taking into account the larger 
social dialectical process. Within this social dialectic, objectivation can be 
defined as the process by which people actively create, apply, and manifest 
(inter)subjective knowledge. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967, p. 
60) identified three moments in the social dialectic: (a) externalization, or the 
act of imposing the self on the material world; (b) objectivation, the realization 
of externalized products, and; (c) internalization, or the socialization of 
consciousness. Georg Hegel used the term objectification (sometimes 
translated as objectivation) in much the same way as Berger and Luckmann 
used externalization, while Karl Marx used the term to refer to a more active 
manipulation of the social and material world (Ritzer, 1988, p. 49). If 
objectivation is treated as the interactive social process by which people 
impose themselves on the world through action and intention, the Marxian 
sense of the term appears most appropriate for this analysis, (i.e., similar to 
Berger & Luckmann1s externalization, but in a more material, active, and 
empirical sense). Most often, these objectivations, in the Marxian sense, are 
social processes with the intent to realize an objective end, product, or human 
artifact. People, in turn, experience these objects, products, or artifacts as 
objective reality. This interactive process of human experience will be referred 
to as subjectivation (i.e., similar to internalization, but also in a more active, 
empirical sense). Reification occurs when people artificially separate human 
knowledge from human action, artifacts, and experience. Within this social 
dialectic, reality is always a dynamic intersubjective phenomenon, with 
knowledge itself as a foundation. Furthermore, any separation or reification of 
subject and object is, quite literally, meaningless. 
2 
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If one accepts the notion that objective reality is an intersubjective 
phenomenon, the necessity of treating technology as a form of humanly 
constructed and maintained knowledge then becomes more clear. Through 
the process of objectivation, technology becomes removed (i.e., reified) from 
the realm of human construction, maintenance, responsibility, and control. 
Consequently, it's objectivated form(s) can then become subjectivated as an 
external autonomous force with apparently constraining consequences and 
effects. Such reification can increase the likelihood that consequences will 
remain latent, that social and psychological impacts might be perceived as 
negative, and that people might perceive they have no control over or 
responsibility for these outcomes. The scope of these consequences, impacts, 
and their potentials is far-reaching. Mayr suggested: 
Technology as a fundamental human activity is intimately related to all 
other human activities and thus is an integral, indispensable part of all 
human culture and is not, as one often hears, an alien, inhuman force 
unleashed upon mankind by some external agent. (Mayr, 1986, p. xv) 
What is more significant sociologically is that this relationship can be measured 
and empirically studied for a better understanding of the interrelationship 
between technology, society, and social change. 
The interactive relationship between technology and all other 
manifestations of human life and culture can be proven, even 
interactions as intractable and elusive as that between the political, 
social, economic, or religious ideas dominant in a given society and 
contemporary preferences and designs of technological hardware. 
(Mayr, 1986, p. xv) 
For the purposes of sociological explanation, it is especially important to make 
the distinction between technology as human knowledge and its subsequently 
reified form(s). With this in mind, a very cautious operationalization of the 
concept of technology must be undertaken. 
It is difficult to discuss technology without also referring to machines, 
inventions, techniques, and engineering. . . . [In] treating these 
separately and focusing on technology as a type of knowledge system, 
it is easier to see and understand the intimate character of the 
relationship between technology and society. (Weinstein, 1982, p. xii) 
The operationalization of the concept of technology still remains 
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problematic. Yet without a better understanding of what technology means, a 
researcher cannot even formulate meaningful hypotheses. The first step in this 
understanding is making an analytical distinction between technological 
knowledge and its potentially reified forms, e.g., technical processes, products, 
and the human experience of them. Any first-order analysis must hypothesize 
initial cause and effect relationships when choosing a meaningful and logical 
independent variable for testing. This requires sorting out temporal moments 
within the larger social dialectic. In addition, without such an analytical 
distinction concerning the nature of technology, the realities of multiple 
causation and mutually contradicting yet reciprocally reinforcing dialectical 
interrelationships tend to lead the researcher down long and spurious paths. A 
review of the literature indicates that this distinction is absent or distorted 
throughout much of the sociological treatment of technology. In order to 
understand the meaning and significance of technology as an explanatory 
variable for sociological analyses, a more comprehensive examination of the 
topic must be undertaken. 
Scope of the Problem 
· Based on the above observations and background information, there 
appears to be a serious misunderstanding concerning the meaning, 
application, and significance of technology as a variable in sociological 
investigations. , This mandates a more comprehensive examination of the 
history of technology throughout the discipline of sociology. Through such an 
examination one may develop a more comprehensive understanding of 
technology as it relates to sociological and scientific phenomena and thought. 
A better and more comprehensive understanding of technology can and 
should also provide a theoretical framework upon which to build empirical 
investigations which better explain human behavior and social phenomena. 
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The scope of this study is focused on the examination of existing 
literature in the discipline of sociology, particularly from classical and 
contemporary sociological theory. In addition to this body of literature, an 
examination of a few of the popular contemporary empirical analyses utilizing 
technology as a primary variable will be discussed. Finally, a model which 
synthesizes the various approaches discussed will be used in the development 
of a research proposal which better addresses the explanatory power of 
technology as a variable in sociological analyses. 
Theoretical Assumptions and Clarification of Terms 
This thesis and research proposal will operate under the following 
assumptions: 
1. Knowledge, of which technology is a part, is humanly constructed, 
defined, and maintained. 
2. People have the innate capability and desire to both objectivate (i.e., 
actively create, apply, manifest) and subjectivate (i.e., experience, interpret, 
evaluate) knowledge such that the relationship between objective and 
subjective realities becomes inherently dialectical and indivisible. 
3. Reification is the process by which objectivated knowledge is realized 
in 11things. 11 In turn, these things becomes subjectivated as inhuman objects 
outside of their exclusive objectivated origins and, consequently, outside of 
direct human controls. Reification is also (especially) applicable to technology 
as a form of knowledge. 
4. Technology is first and foremost a form of knowledge; in this sense 
technology is inherently neutral-all value attached to technology is dependent 
exclusively on the experiential context of its objectivated and potentially reified 
form(s). 
5. lntersubjectively, no such thing as social causation in a strict linear 
sense can exist. Social phenomena exist (i.e., derive meaning) only in a 
dialectical relationship to all other phenomena and, for the purposes of 
sociological explanation, are contingent upon our relative positions, 
interpretations of, and impositions on and within the larger social-material 
context. 
6. It is also assumed that any larger social reality dialectically 
encompasses all possible variables within the potentially infinite variety of 
objective and subjective phenomena. In addition, one must include the 
complex array of social phenomena involving human action and experience. 
Thus, any adequate explanatory model must take into account the range, 
scope, and dialectical interrelationships of this larger reality,, including the 
intersubjective micro and macro social-material context, human action, and 
human experience. 
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Given the above analytical assumptions, technology can now be 
operationalized as follows: An explanatory model using 11technological 
knowledge 11 as an independent variable must first consider the subjective and 
objective dimensions of technology, for example, the interrelationships between 
technological knowledge, technological processes, products, and social 
consequences. One must then develop indicators from the realm of human 
7 
action and experience to facilitate measurement and explanation of the 
relationships between the phenomena. The more general context of 
technology places it in a dialectical and macro-historical relationship with other 
forms of knowledge, most specifically, scientific knowledge and social thought. 
Historically, these interrelationships have been poorly conceptualized and 
operationalized. A dialectical model can be constructed to better illustrate 
these concepts (see Figure 1). Note that the categories as illustrated are 
neither mutually exclusive nor logically exhaustive of all potential variables in the 
social-dialectical moment; there is an implicit overlap between and within the 
component categories of the model. 
___ -;, objectivation process 
social interaction 
technological processes 














social integration vs. alienation 
primary needs- met vs. unmet 
[quality of life) 
Figure 1. The Social Dialectic with Technology as a Variable 
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The model and the assumptions herein draw heavily from dialectic and conflict 
theory, the sociology of knowledge, and the Critical School of sociology. A 
social dialectic is illustrated in the model which encompasses the objective and 
subjective components of social reality. This dichotomy has been well 
developed throughout the German philosophical tradition, particularly in the 
works of Kant, Hegel, Marx and, more recently, the attempts of the Critical 
School. In addition, the model includes the essential human processes of 
objectivation and subjectivation, i.e., human action and experience. This 
dichotomy also is part of the German philosophical tradition and has been 
conceptually addressed by Hegel, Marx, Mannheim, and, more recently, Berger 
and Luckmann (1967) in their treatise on the sociology of knowledge. The 
model identifies several overlapping areas of thought, action, structures, and 
experiences, i.e., technological, sociological, and natural/scientific. It is 
asserted herein that changes in any one of these areas changes the 
interrelationships throughout the rest of the model and the nature of the whole 
itself. 
Through the construction of such a model, a more comprehensive 
analytical reference point upon which to build a better understanding of the 
complex interrelationships of the social world (in this case, technology as an 
explanatory variable within the social world) may be facilitated. The model was 
initially constructed to resolve the several criticisms made herein of the 
inadequate treatment of technology throughout the history of social thought 
and to offer a more comprehensive and synthesized analytical alternative. The 
utility of the model will be further developed and illustrated through the following 
analysis, critique, and review. 
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The review of the literature and research proposal operate under the 
analytical framework and assumptions presented herein, utilizing the model 
presented in Figure 1 , with implicit debt to its exemplars as credited 
throughout. The purpose of this endeavor then becomes twofold: (a) to apply 
this model and method of analysis for the purpose of explaining, using 
technological phenomena as empirical examples, the relationships between 
subjective knowledge, human action and experience, and the objective world, 
and (b) to offer a better understanding of the importance of technological 
knowledge as an explanatory variable in a larger social and scientific milieu. 
Research Questions 
The question posed herein specifically involves the reification of 
technological knowledge and the consequences of this reification. More 
specifically, a research proposal is constructed which would test the hypothesis 
that the reification of technological knowledge results in perceptions that 
technology is oppressive, autonomous, and uncontrollable. The administration 
of the study and instrument are described. Various indicators are developed, 
based on previous research, which address technology as knowledge, 
process, products, and components of human experience. Attitudinal scales 
are then developed which utilize these indicators. In addition to measurement 
of attitudes, experiential and demographic variables are also addressed. 
Suggestions are made for statistical analyses. It is suggested that through the 
construction and utilization of the proposed research, it would become more 
apparent that an analytical distinction must be made between technological 
knowledge and its reified forms if meaningful sociological explanations are to 
be pursued. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Background Information 
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Technology as an institutionalized concept began to emerge parallel to 
the scientific and industrial revolutions, generally from the mid-eighteenth to the 
mid-twentieth centuries (Weinstein, 1982, p. 3). However, technology as a form 
of knowledge has been a defining part of cultures, societies, and civilizations 
throughout history. 11lt is knowledge designed to extend the capabilities of 
humans in dealing with their environment, to overcome constitutional and 
environmental limitations11 (Weinstein, 1982, p. xi). R. J. Forbes explained: 
Man did not seek to understand nature merely to satisfy his curiosity. 
He had to survive in a strange, hostile world. He had to come to grips 
with nature using as his main weapon the intellect [i.e. capacity for 
knowledge] that distinguished him from the animals. The primary thing 
he had to do was to find and collect food, and food was not always in 
plentiful supply. All his long life on earth man has had to use his 
intelligence, to observe nature around him, to remember the facts he 
perceives, and to try to apply them in a way that will increase his security 
and comfort. (Forbes, 1958, p. 4) 
Forbes thus pointed out the inevitable necessity of constructing and 
maintaining technological knowledge, but Marx pointed out the necessity of 
sociologically studying it: 
Technology reveals the active relation of man to nature, the direct 
[ dialectical] process of the production of his life, and thereby it also lays 
bare the process of the production of the social relations of his life, and 
of the mental conceptions that flow from these relations. (Marx, 
1977/1867, p. 493) 
Some contemporary sociologists also accorded technology a central role in 
social development and 11sociocultural evolution.11 One of those is Gerhard 
Lenski. 
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We reviewed the basic trends in human societies to determine 
what type of cultural information has been most important in 
sociocultural evolution. The answer is clear. Technological information 
[i.e. knowledge]-information about the utilization of the material 
resources of the environment to satisfy human needs-has been far 
more important than any other in shaping the most basic processes of 
development and change in human societies. Had there been no 
technological innovations during the last 10,000 years, all societies 
would be small, nomadic populations of hunters and gatherers, living 
much the way our Stone Age ancestors did. Instead technological 
advance has propelled us rapidly (by evolutionary standards) from 
Stone Age to Atomic Age. Thus we must define sociocultural evolution 
as the process of development and change that results from the 
acquisition and use of new cultural information, especially technological 
information. (Lenski & Lenski, 1978, p. 67) 
Having identified the necessity of treating technology as a body of knowledge, 
and subsequently, having laid out the sociological necessity of studying 
technology as such, we now turn to a historical-comparative analysis of 
technology and sociology within the history of social thought. 
Technology and Sociology in Early Great Britain 
During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries there 
occurred drastic social, scientific, and material changes which were conducive 
to the development of an institutionalized concept of technology, but such a 
conceptualization of technology was not yet separate nor distinct from scientific 
and social philosophy. These changes most significantly included social and 
economic development combined with a transformation in thought from 
fatalism to positivism (Weinstein, 1982). At that time scientific and technological 
knowledge were not considered as separate fields of human knowledge and 
endeavor. Many of the enlightened philosophers were also scientists, 
inventors, and social innovators (Jeremy Bentham, Condorcet, Ben Franklin, 
Adam Smith, Auguste Comte, etc.). 
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This new conception of development allowed the amateur intellectuals of 
the Enlightenment to view man as an active and effective agent of 
change, and encouraged people to seek to understand and improve 
upon the remarkable transformations taking place around them. For 
many, this search led to inventions of new machines and processes. 
For others, it led to inventions of social systems, new constitutions, and 
the formulation of theories whereby social systems and constitutions 
could be studied and changed. For most, this search led to an intense 
interest in both machines and social innovation. (Weinstein, 1982, p. 8) 
Social philosophy and social innovation during the post-enlightenment 
time period went hand in hand with scientific and technological innovation. 
During this time period there was also a realization that these areas of thought 
were indelibly intertwined, i.e., changes in one area might and often did 
precipitate change in another. Literature after this time period tended to treat 
the areas of social, scientific, and technological innovation as separate and 
discrete bodies of knowledge. A similar developmental path occurred in early 
post-enlightenment France. 
Sociology and Technology in Early France 
Early post-enlightment France was considered the intellectual center of 
Europe. However, while England experienced the 11industrial11 side of the "twin 
revolutions, 11 the driving intellectual force in France was 11political11 revolution and 
order as opposed to 11industrial 11 in England. 
In part because of the country's lack of economic development and its 
sudden rise to prominence in intellectual realms, the key social and 
technological issues of revolutionary France were not directly related to 
industrialization; by the late eighteenth century, it was no longer 
meaningful to ask if the country should industrialize but only how to do 
so and how to deal with related social impacts. . . . [The] revolutionary 
era that extended from before 1789 to about 1830 was a struggle not to 
initiate but to institutionalize development, and thus establish a place in 
the social order for technology and social science. (Weinstein, 1982, p. 
14) 
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The early French enlightened philosophy of Descartes, Pascal, Bayle, 
Voltaire, Montesquieu, Condorcet, Turgot, and Rousseau, along with the British 
political philosophy and positivism of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Adam 
Ferguson, and Adam Smith dominated the intellectual atmosphere of early 
France. This was the intellectual context which served as the foundation for the 
philosophy of sociology's "grandfather," Saint-Simon (Ashley & Orenstein, 1985; 
Bronowski & Mazlish, 1960; Weinstein, 1982). Saint-Simon, as the mentor of 
sociology's "founding father," Auguste Comte, began a project intended to 
"employ science and technology to reorganize postrevolutionary France" 
(Weinstein, 1982, p. 14). 
Saint-Simon's main idea was that industrialism was a new era in 
history. Progress was not a matter of science alone, but affected all the 
conditions of life. This new society, growing out of a declining feudalism, 
would provide the basis for solving all the old problems. Saint-Simon 
was the first to discern the new order emerging, and he took on the role 
of prophet concerning how it should operate. (Collins & Makowsky, 
1984, p. 23) 
Saint-Simon realized that scientific knowledge, technology, and social thought 
were all complexly intertwined. He proposed the reconstruction of society 
based on scientific and technological knowledge. In reality, he proposed a 
technocratic meritocracy. 
What Saint-Simon developed turned out to be the characteristic 
ideology of industrialism. It is found all over the world today, among the 
technocrats of the modern French state, in the British civil service, and in 
the great American bureaucracies from the universities to the RAND 
Corporation. It is a belief that progress is based on science and that 
new societies are created out of the old (in the developing nations as 
well as the more advanced countries of the East and West), without 
revolution or conflict, simply by putting the scientists and industrialists in 
charge. (Collins & Makowsky, 1984, p. 25) 
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Saint-Simon saw science and technology (then an undifferentiated body 
of knowledge) as the 11answer to all problems. 11 The concept was undoubtedly 
value-laden. Saint-Simon, in the context of postrevolutionary France, saw a 
dire need for a more stable and directed reorganization of society based on 
positivistic empirical knowledge and immutable scientific laws. 
Saint-Simon envisioned a highly socialized economic order, 
democratically [technocratically] governed-politically and morally-by 
men of learning dedicated to positivist principles. This system, while 
ancient in concept, is one of the first modern models of technocracy, 
government by scientists and engineers. With it, the pursuit of social 
and nonsocial science was linked to the application of technology for the 
improvement of [human conditions]. This doctrine was issued in 
response to the unprecedented development then occurring. It was 
meant to provide a structure for making progress in the economy, 
science, and technology a regular part of the ongoing business of the 
state. (Weinstein, 1982, p. 15) 
Comte followed in Saint-Simon's footsteps. However, 11Saint-Simon was 
a thoroughgoing atheist [sic] and materialist, a believer in science and industry, 
whereas Comte felt that society could not be held together by reason alone, 
but demanded faith 11 (Collins & Makowsky, 1984, p. 28). Comte tended to 
focus more on the ideational side of social evolution while Saint-Simon was 
concerned with more substantive means and ends. Even so, Saint-Simon did 
not tend to reify the concepts of scientific and technological knowledge, though 
these concepts were distorted by various social values and political motives 
inherent in the context in which he lived. 11Comte1s approach sought to view 
truth itself as an appropriate object of scientific study, subject to the same 
causes and conditions that affect any other aspect of human behavior11 
(Weinstein, 1982, p. 15). Comte's answer to the material and ideational 
contradictions of that socio-historical context was to formulate a new 
institutionalized discipline which he called 11social physics, 11 later changed to 
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sociology. However, being born out of the "twin revolutions" (i.e. industrial and 
political), 
[the field of sociology] was formulated not merely as a formal discipline 
whose own development was foremost (although Saint-Simon, Comte, 
and the others appreciated the purer orientation in science), but as a 
knowledge system inextricably tied to technology and government. 
(Weinstein, 1982, p. 17) 
In France the concepts of sociology, science, and technology became 
institutionalized; however, they became institutionalized as separate bodies of 
knowledge within the French university system. Science as an institutionalized 
form of knowledge began to isolate its premises and exemplars into the 
disciplines of the natural sciences, e.g. astronomy, physics, biology, anatomy, 
etc. Technology became the object and subject of engineering and, in its 
emerging reified form, also became the defining basis and central means of a 
growing industrial social-political-economic base. Sociology, on the other 
hand, was tied to "education" in general, and at the hands of Emile Durkheim, 
became an intellectualized, institutionalized, and separate body of knowledge in 
itself. Thus, in France, as well as in Great Britain, science, technology, and 
[industrial] society were the central (yet increasingly separate) themes of social 
thought, and technology often became understood as either the "answer to all 
our problems" or as the "source of all our problems." 
Clearly, the segmentation and institutionalization of knowledge into 
artificially exclusive disciplines would have latent consequences for the futher 
development of social, scientific, and technological thought. Once the bodies 
of knowledge now called science, technology, and sociology were separated 
and institutionalized, it follows that the "substance" of the knowledge also would 
become more reified-i.e. astronomy "became" stars and planets; anatomy 
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became organs and tissue; society became institutions such as the family or 
church, with "social facts" such as norms, laws, and collectivities, and 
technology became machines, inventions, and revolutionary products and 
processes, all apparently independent of the knowledge by which they are 
objectivated and understood. The institutionalization and segmentation of 
knowledge separated the object of knowledge from the subject, both within 
and between the disciplines of concern herein. This rationalization and 
bureaucratization of knowledge, particularly in the fields of science, technology, 
and society, is a central theme (and proposition) around which this thesis 
revolves, as well having been a primary theme at the other emerging 
geographic center of European social thought: Germany. 
Sociology and Technology in Early Germany 
Social thought in 19th century Germany was inspired by 300 years of the 
Western intellectual tradition flourishing in Western Europe. 
The ideas of the French Revolution were influential; the English 
Utilitarians were working out a reasoned system, and the American 
thinkers had actually had the chance to begin a new society. At the 
same time, the small German states reentered the intellectual ferment of 
the West, which Martin Luther had once so strongly provoked; and their 
contribution had a subtle influence on the course of history. (Bronowski 
& Mazlish, 1960, p. 472) 
In Germany, as in France and England, sociological, scientific, and 
technological knowledge were not initially separate and distinct bodies of 
knowledge. In Germany, the intellectual revolution was ignited by the classic 
poets, of whom Johann Wolfgang von Goethe was the most renowned and 
influential. 
Goethe was a scientist as well as a poet, and a highly individual scientist. 
He was interested particularly in the growth and form of plants, in which 
(like Erasmus Darwin in England) he sensed the underlying unity in the 
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development of nature which Charles Darwin later expressed in the 
theory of evolution. Goethe also rediscovered the Renaissance and the 
antiquities of Rome; he was a successful public servant, particularly in 
education; and his wide and vivid interests fired the minds of men far 
beyond Germany. (Bronowski & Mazlish, 1960, p. 472) 
Science and technology in early Germany were thought of as ways of 
understanding nature, the environment, and the natural (dialectical) 
interrelationship of humans and nature. Thus, in Germany, as well as in France 
and England, 
[philosophy and social thought were] an attempt to find foundations for 
the new science [in fact, science was a natural outgrowth of philosophy], 
and many philosophers were scientists. Kant was among these, and his 
philosophy was such an attempt to close a gap in the foundations of 
science which had been opened unexpectedly in his boyhood. 
(Bronowski & Mazlish, 1960, p. 473) 
Kant argued that science, as subject and object (which also subsumes 
technology), was dialectically inseparable from both experience and a priori 
knowledge. 
Hume had shown that there is no empirical evidence for causality; and 
Kant concluded from this that empiricism is not enough, and that nature 
can only be understood if we see that under empirical experience lies a 
framework of a priori knowledge. . . . [Some] knowledge must be a 
priori to make empirical science possible at all. (Bronowski & Mazlish, 
1960, p. 477) 
Kant pointed out that people are simultaneously both objects and subjects of 
nature, and that to change either inevitably changes the other. 11Kant had given 
a new sense of dignity to men, in which the limitations of nature were not 
obstacles but the natural conditions for human freedom 11 (Bronowski & Mazlish, 
1960, p. 479). In Kant1s time, understanding nature (and its limits) was the aim 
of scientific knowledge; technology, as a part of scientific knowledge, was the 
mechanism by which the limitations of nature were continually redefined and 
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refined. Only through creative action, experience, and understanding could an 
empirical reality (and empirical knowledge) become possible. 
We can postulate the real world only because we know it, and the part 
that our senses play has to be analyzed with care. Man is not simply a 
passive receiver on whom the outside world prints a set of impressions. 
The knower and what he knows influence one another; what is known is 
in part imposed by the knower; so that the knower is active, is creative 
[emphasis added], and thereby becomes what Kant called a self or ego. 
(Bronowski & Mazlish, 1960, p. 483) 
People create the world by objectivating knowledge. This, in turn, and 
simultaneously, is experienced (subjectivated) by the observer, expanding and 
recreating the knowledge by which the objectivation is maintained and realized. 
These ideas would later be picked up by Hegel and Marx. 
With Hegel, one sees philosophy and social thought start to become 
removed from active scientific objectivation and experience. Hegel was not a 
scientist and innovator, at least in the sense that many of the great thinkers of 
France and England were. Hegel was an academician, and from the age of 
five he pursued the world of the classics and the philosophy of early French, 
English, and German writers as opposed to tinkering with the 11nuts and bolts11 
of the empirical world. Hegel, as opposed to Kant, saw knowledge (Weltgeist), 
or 11reason," as the 11given 11 in society, and man's primary objective was simply to 
realize the nature of consciousness itself. Moreover, Hegel asserted that 
knowledge and subject, apparently even in the absence of the object, could 
change the nature of reality. 
Thus, before Marx was born, Hegel had concluded that the whole point 
of philosophy-or of any kind of social theorizing-was to change the 
world. As far as he was concerned, however, merely to understand the 
world in new ways and in a new form is already to have changed it. 
(Ashley & Orenstein, 1985, p. 129) 
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In terms of science and technology, Hegel questioned the impacts of 
technology and the 11new science11 much as other enlightened philosophers did. 
The trend in modern societies, according to Hegel, was the separation of the 
subject from the 11whole11 or 11totality11 of universal reason (i.e. reality; existence). 
Hegel believed that human society becomes most reasonable 
and most just when social institutions do not divide and fragment 
subjects who subsequently must experience [realize] themselves as 
· incomplete. . . . Factory workers might have total control over some 
small part of the environment through the use of technology. By 
objectifying themselves as cogs in an impersonal system of production, 
however, they lose sight of the ends of human striving [i.e. the 
attainment of pure self-reflexive reason]. The modern organization of 
work is often too complex and the involvement of the individual worker 
too specific for workers to be able to see themselves as expressing the 
totality of anything humanly produced. Thus modern workers are likely 
to experience themselves as the expression of something that is alien to 
them. (Ashley & Orenstein, 1985. p. 131) 
Hegel saw 11primitive11 societies and human beings as being incapable of 
attaining pure reason. However, the other side of the situation is that "Unlike 
the modern, private individual, the primitive human being does not suffer from 
the sense of being excluded from the totality of human experience11 (Ashley & 
Orenstein, 1985, p. 131). Hegel posited that pure reason could be attained 
only through the realization of a sense of community and the self as a part of it. 
The idea of the autonomous self, or any individually constructed reality, was 
artificial. 
Hegel pointed out that the essence, or nature, of a person's 
thought lies beyond that particular person; hence the reflective 
experience of oneself as a particular kind of social object is a product of 
a social whole, not a product of the individual. (Ashley & Orenstein, 
1985, p. 134) 
Here is where Hegel's idealist philosophy loses its utility in explaining scientific 
and technological knowledge. Pure reason, or any implication of an inherent 
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11order11 in objective and/or subjective reality, is the very essence of science as a 
body of knowledge. However, in true dialectical form, scientific knowledge only 
derives human meaning from its objective manifestations. Technology is 
understood as knowledge only in relation to its potentially reified forms. Hegel 
tried to circumvent this sophist's trap by asserting that the 11external11 world was 
both objective and subjective. In addition, 
[Hegel] denied that there is any thing-in-itself. To Hegel, there is no 
reality until we know it. We exist by virtue of knowing the outside world-
but the world also exists only [ emphasis added] by virtue of our knowing 
it. 11The real is the rational and the rational is real, 11 [said Hegel]. 
(Bronowski & Mazlish, 1960, p. 483) 
Hegel's dialectic was decidedly teleological. It assumed some end-state 
of pure reason, and then explained knowledge and (removed it from) action by 
way of a rational, reflexive, means to this somewhat metaphysical end. It tried 
to rationalize away non-rational action, and teleologically, confused the non-
rational (absence of means-ends calculations) with the irrational (means-ends 
calculations which are not complementary). It reified knowledge as an end-in-
itself and ignored the (more sociologically important) process of world-building 
and social construction, which would later become the foundation for Marx's 
dialectic. More significantly, the true 11objective vs. subjective11 dialectic not only 
addresses the objective and subjective components of the external world, but 
does so on different levels, i.e., objective and subjective aspects of knowledge, 
in addition to things like culture and social relationships, on and between the 
levels of the individual, organization, and society, in space and time. Marx 
sought to bring Hegel's philosophy back down to earth or, in other words, 11turn 
Hegel on his head.11 Using the dialectic as an analytical tool, Marx, the realist, 
approached the sociological world-building process from a materialist 
perspective. 
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In place of Hegel's "spirit" as the prime mover of history, Marx inserted 
the forces of production, as Smith and Saint-Simon had suggested. In 
doing so, technology was once again made a major subject of what we 
now call sociological inquiry. (Weinstein, 1982, p. 19) 
Marx, true to his own biography, failed to conform to the trend toward 
the institutionalization of knowledge, science, technology, and social thought. 
He actively sought political and economic reforms, spent time in the factories of 
London, and, with Engels, may have been one of the first "technology 
assessors" (Weinstein, 1982, p. 18). Marx made no explicit distinction between 
scientific and technological knowledge, but he did speak of them as separate, 
and also of their specific reified forms. However, in doing so, he intended to 
point out the necessity of their interrelationships in the objective world. 11Marx 
made no sharp distinctions between social scientific theory, technology, and 
political praxis; rather he made their connection essential" (Weinstein, 1982, p. 
19). He rightly pointed out that the value and any evaluation of those products 
of science and technology is exclusively contingent upon the context in which 
they are applied. 
The alienating potential of the reified forms of science, technology, 
economy, and government was one of Marx's central concerns. 11Like the other 
founders of social science, Marx was certain that the industrial revolution had 
secularized the human prospect" (Weinstein, 1982, p. 19). Like Hegel, Marx 
saw a growing gap between the self (i.e., species being as he called it ) and the 
means by which the self is formed and maintained (i.e., through objectified 
knowledge in the form of labor, subjectivated as an extension of the self 
through the use-value of human material and non-material products). Marx's 
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all-encompassing dialectic was one of man to nature. Man, as an active and 
creative force in and of nature, alters the physical and natural environment and, 
in the process, alters and recreates himself (Marx, 1977/1867). By definition, 
the knowledge of the means to modify and alter nature for human ends is 
called technology. In this sense, technology was a primary integrating theme 
throughout all of Marx1s work. 
·Historically, the separation of social thought, science, and technology, in 
addition to the institutionalization of each of these (artificially separated) bodies 
of knowledge, resulted in man1s alienation from himself and from the 
processes, products, and rewards of his labors. If the goal of existence is to 
realize one1s human potential through human action (i.e., labor), then any gap 
in the social dialectic inevitably results in the experience of alienation from one1s 
own humanness (i.e., species-being, to use Marx1s term). This apparent gap in 
the social dialectic creates the necessary preconditions for negative impacts 
and latent social consequences outside of human controls; specifically, at least 
for Marx, the contradictions of capitalism which inevitably deteriorate the 
foundations of 11modern11 capitalist society. 
While the concept of development remained central to Marx1s 
thought, it was demystified. By 1848, it was clear that development 
would not inevitably proceed in an orderly, rational fashion merely 
because Europe had entered the age of science and technology. For 
Marx, the dialectical nature of productive forces, marked principally by 
the perennial struggle between the means of production, assured that 
the development spurred by modern technology must occur in a 
conflictual and uneven manner. ... [Like] the Scots, he focused on the 
unintended and ironic side of progress, on the 11darker side11 of the 
enlightenment. But like the French Fathers, he also believed in the 
power of man, aided by technology, eventually to mitigate negative 
impacts. (Weinstein, 1982, p. 19) 
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Marx saw technology as a two-edged sword. This knowledge could be used 
to better the lot of mankind, or, exclusively in the wrong hands, could ultimately 
oppress the multitude of persons and lay the foundation for the eventual 
destruction of society and life as we know it. In either case, it was a necessary 
means to the material development and evolution of individuals, cultures, and 
societies. Being both a progressive philosopher and positivist, Marx saw 
technology, its processes, products, and impacts, as a pivotal point in the 
future development of society. These ideas are seen most clearly in Marx's 
theory of social stratification and the stratification and control of knowledge and 
power: 
Stratification, as Marx knew, has crucial bearing not only on 
sociological theory and research, but also affects the way in which 
technological innovation is conducted: Who conducts it, in whose 
interests, and for what purposes. These considerations identify an 
important way in which social factors shape technology. Yet at this 
point, perhaps more than any other in Marx's work, the current social 
science disciplines-some of which have embraced the stress on 
stratification-diverge from one another and from engineering and other 
technical fields-which have generally ignored it. In the 1848 era, there 
was a third [i.e. Marx's] attempt [following the explicit one in England 
and the other in France] to formulate a systematic, scientific, explanation 
of the moral and social consequences of industrialization. By this time 
the economic and political effects of the industrial revolution had spread 
to the masses. The results were, by Marx's account, less than entirely 
progressive, liberating, or enlightening. (Weinstein, 1982, p. 20) 
In effect, technology, science, and society had become institutionalized 
past the point of return and, inevitably, past the point of accountability. In 
terms of liberating and emancipating the human condition, we had taken a 
giant step backward on the socio-evolutionary ladder. Man had created 
structures he could not escape and which he was forced to bow down to and 
worship as deities. Science, technology, economy, government, etc., all 
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became reified forms of objectivated knowledge, taking on ever-more 
rationalized forms. Marx could not believe that people would continue to 
tolerate the contradictions of such an oppressive and ambiguous social order. 
·However, not all the social commentors in Germany were as optimistic 
as Marx that human technology, innovation, and necessity would overcome. A 
pervading disenchantment of the enlightened world was becoming apparent. 
One of the most important figures in this trend was Max Weber. 
Sociology and Technology in Late Nineteenth Century Europe 
Weber, Sociology, and Technology 
In Germany, and throughout late 19th century Western Europe, society 
was characterized by a growing trend toward increased rationality, 
specialization, professionalization, and bureaucratization. 
By the turn of the twentieth century the West had grasped the 
lesson of the industrial revolution and had institutionalized development. 
This achievement was not based on a Smithian model of the perfectly 
competitive market, nor on a Marxist model in which a disenfranchised 
working class would seize power and institute socialism, nor even on a 
Saint-Simonian vision of technocracy. Instead, an R&D approach to 
development was initiated in which producers, sellers, buyers, and even 
the working class were transformed into highly trained specialists. In the 
universities, schools, and professions, functions were defined and 
graded in terms of the services they rendered to the development of 
industrial, and frequently this meant military, technology. (Weinstein, 
1982, p. 25) 
Rationality was a central theme in Max Weber's works. He saw the 
rationality of technology as a dependent variable in relation to the market 
economy and its supporting rationale, and as an independent variable in the 
social relationships surrounding bureaucratic organizations and modern 
culture. He illustrated this by comparing the traditional "vocational ethic" of the 
Hindu caste system to the economic rationality of the modern West: 
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[This] vocational ethic of a caste system is-at least as far as the 
crafts are concerned-notably traditionalistic, rather than rational. It 
finds its fulfillment and confirmation in the absolutely qualitative 
perfection of the product fashioned by the craft. Very alien to its mode 
of thinking is the possibility of rationalizing the method of production, 
which is basic to all modern rational technology, or the possibility of 
systematically organizing a commercial enterprise along the lines of a 
rational business economy, which is the foundation of modern 
capitalism. (Weber, 1978/1921, p. 436) 
Weber saw 11technique 11 as the means by which ends are accomplished. 
However, he interchangeably used 11technology11 and 11technique 11 in the same 
discussion. In the discussion, he claimed to distinguish between 11economy11 
and 11technology. 11 To complicate matters more, he then equated 11rational 
technique11 with the term 11scientific knowledge. 11 Even so, the analysis is useful 
in illustrating the importance of the relationship between knowledge and 
technology, technique as an objectivation process, and the reified forms of 
technology, all with potentially negative consequences. 
[Not] every action which is rational in its choice of means will be called 
11rational economic action, 11 or even 11economic action11 in any sense; in 
particular, the term 11economy11 will be distinguished from that of 
11technology. 11 The 11technique 11 of an action refers to the means 
employed as opposed to the meaning or end to which the action is, in 
the last analysis, oriented. 11Rational 11 technique is a choice of means 
which is consciously and systematically oriented to the experience and 
reflection of the actor, which consists, at the highest level of rationality, in 
scientific knowledge. What is concretely to be treated as a technique 
[i.e. treated as scientific knowledge in its reified form] is thus variable. 
The ultimate meaning of a concrete act may, seen in the total context of 
action, be of a 11technical 11 order; that is, it may be significant only as a 
means in this broader context. Then the 11meaning 11 of the concrete act 
(viewed from the larger context) lies in its technical function; and, 
conversely, the means which are applied to accomplish this are its 
11techniques. 11 In this sense there are techniques of every conceivable 
type of action, techniques of prayer, of asceticism, of thought and 
research, of memorizing, of education, of exercising political or 
hierocratic domination, of administration, of making love, of making war, 
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of musical performances, of sculpture and painting, of arriving at legal 
decisions. All these are capable of the widest variation in degree of 
rationality. The presence of a "technical question" always means there is 
some doubt over the choice of the most rational means to an end. 
(Weber, 1978/1921, p. 65) 
So Weber subtly hinted at the distinction between the rational-scientific 
knowledge of techniques, i.e., technology, and the concrete forms of technique, 
i.e., technological processes, products, and means. He then pointed out that 
"technical rationality," as a means to an anticipated end, has the potential to 
achieve ends which are also unanticipated: 11ln the present terminology we can 
conceive of a rational technique for achieving ends which no one desires .... 
[The] procedure under normal circumstances would be clearly irrational 
because there would be no demand for the product" (Weber, 1978/1921, p. 
67). Weber asserted that "rational technology" is largely determined by 
perceived economic ends. 
The fact that what is called the technological development of 
modern times has been so largely oriented economically to profit-
making is one of the fundamental facts of the history of technology. But 
however fundamental it has been, the economic orientation has by no 
means stood alone in shaping the development of technology. In 
addition, a part has been played by other-worldly interests and all sorts 
of fantasies [non-rational elements], a part by preoccupation with artistic 
problems, and by various other non-economic motives. None the less, 
the main emphasis at all times, and especially the present, has lain in the 
economic determination of technological development. Had not rational 
calculation formed the basis of economic activity, had there not been 
very particular conditions in its economic background, rational 
technology could have never come into existence. (Weber, 1978/1921, 
p. 67) 
Herein lie the contradictions of modern technology. Once the 
bureaucratic institutionalization of technology as a form of knowledge is in 
place; once the reified forms of this knowledge, i.e. machines, process, 
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products, etc., become the means to another reified end, i.e., money-making 
(as opposed to explicity productive and creative ends), technology becomes 
decidedly irrational (producing non-complementary means and ends), as 
Weber pointed out. "Rational technology," at it is highest level of rationality, is 
part of "scientific knowledge." Scientific knowledge, according to Weber, 
"[first] arose in connection with practical considerations. Its most immediate 
and often sole purpose was the attainment of value-judgements concerning 
measures of State economic policy" (Weber, 1949/1904, p. 51). Technology, 
as a part of scientific knowledge, then becomes objectivated as a (reified) 
means, i.e., the technique, of maximizing economic production and profit. 
Randall Collins explicated: 
[In] Weber1s scheme, technology [meaning technique] is essentially a 
dependent variable. The key economic characteristic of mechanization 
is that it is feasible only with mass production. (Collins, 1986, p. 25) 
Weber does not elaborate a systematic theory of technological 
innovation, but it would be possible to construct one along these lines. 
He does note that all crucial inventions of the period of industrial takeoff 
were the result of deliberate efforts to cheapen the costs of production. 
These efforts took place because previous conditions had intensified the 
capitalist pursuit of profits. The same argument could be made, 
although Weber did not make it, in regard to the search for methods to 
improve agricultural production that took place in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. The "green revolution" which preceded (and made 
possible) the industrial revolution was not a process of mechanization 
(agricultural mechanization took place only in the late nineteenth 
century) but was, more simply, the application of capitalist methods of 
cost accounting to hitherto traditional agriculture. Thus, it was the shift 
to the calculating practices of the capitalist market economy which 
makes technological innovation itself predictable, rather than, as 
previously, an accidental factor in economic life. (Collins, 1986, pp. 25-
26) 
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Weber, and Collins' interpretation of Weber, tends to reify technological 
knowledge and mistakenly treat it solely as technique, innovation, and the 
processes and products of industrial production. Weinstein pointed out 
[In Weber's approach] technology, like stratification and religion, was at 
most to be treated as one phenomenon among the many in bureaucratic 
society: to be studied, to be accurately related to its true causes and 
effects, and viewed as a variable factor in history and across cultures. 
This type of treatment continues to be important in social science; it 
defines the distinctly sociological way of looking at technology. At the 
same time, it allows the questions of technology's impact to remain 
academic: technology is viewed as an object [i.e. reified] but not as a 
vehicle [of knowledge] in which the 11wisdom 11 of social science, as 
opposed to the prevailing social 11ignorance, 11 might be incorporated .... 
As the social and technical fields are discovering today, this approach, 
though it may have been appropriate for the academic era, is now more 
of an impediment than an aid to understanding. (Weinstein, 1982, pp. 
36-37) 
One must conclude that Weber's analysis falls short of the mark. By his 
failure to adequately distinguish between technology and technique, he failed to 
adequately distinguish between knowledge, motivation, and action. Had 
Weber realized technology is first and foremost a form of knowledge-different, 
yet inseparable, from its objectivated and subsequently reified forms-the idea 
might have been very instrumental to the development of his thesis that ideas 
and culture, in addition to the Marxian notion of material goods and conditions, 
affect the socio-historical development of the Western world. 
The theories of Weber, in Germany, as well as Durkheim, in France, 
illustrate how the institutionalization of knowledge results in the artificial 
separation of social philosophy, science, and technology as bodies of 
knowledge, in addition to how these bodies of knowledge tend to become 
reified as the concepts are operationalized. While Weber saw technology as a 
result of increasing economic rationality, in France, Durkheim saw it as a 
process by which the 11social organism11 became more specialized and 
differentiated. 
Durkheim. Sociology, and Technology 
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Durkheim did not make explicit references to 11technology11 as Weber did, 
nor did he follow Saint-Simon1s footsteps in promoting a democratic 
technocracy. Durkheim1s sociology was primarily concerned with differentiating 
11social11 phenomena from less significant individual actions, thus according 
Sociology (as a discipline) a pristine place in the academic social sciences. An 
ex-post-facto analysis of technology in Durkheim1s sociology places him on the 
positivist side of technological development. Pre-modern societies were 
characterized by mechanicai solidarity in which knowledge of nature and its 
manipulation were undifferentiated and evenly distributed throughout the 
population. Increasing specialization and differentiation-as a socio-
evolutionary process-precipitates the transition from mechanical solidarity to 
organic solidarity. Organic, solidarity is the predominant form of the division of 
labor in modern societies and is characterized by high degrees of 
specialization, differentiation, and interdependence. Durkheim saw this 
increased interdependence as a very positive development in terms of what he 
(and Spencer) fondly referred to as 11social evolution. 11 However, he recognized 
that these increasingly interdependent relationships and emerging complex 
social structures require a parallel evolution of legitimizing normative trust, 
beliefs, and values in order to maintain their operation. Durkheim preferred to 
speak of the social division of labor, thus differentiating it from the concept of 
the same name to which economists refer. 11The division of labor Durkheim is 
talking about is a structure of the society as a whole, of which technical or 
economic division of labor is merely and expression 11 (Aron, 1989/1965, p. 18). 
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Durkheim, like Weber, lost track of the one fundamental social relationship that 
is the operative defining characteristic of social life: All knowledge is socially 
acquired and maintained, and consequently inseparable from the objective and 
subjective experience of it (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 3). As both Durkheim 
and Weber pointed out, 11things 11 such as the division of labor, or a rational 
economic order, can only continue to exist due to the fact that they are 
legitimized and maintained through a normative belief and value system. Such 
linear models of social change fail to address the reciprocal and dialectical 
relationship of humankind to nature. The separation and institutionalization of 
social philosophy, science, and technology exacerbates the problem. The 
11positivism 11 of the early European social philosophers and innovators became 
distorted within the institution. The enlightened philosophy of a social order 
founded on scientific knowledge and principles became fragmented in the face 
of institutional autonomy. 
The institutionalization of disciplinary sociology in the universities 
of Europe contributed to a general estrangement between social science 
and institutionalized technology. The efforts of early sociology's 
proponents helped the discipline achieve a certain degree of acceptance 
as an academic field. But the fact that it was so specialized and 
segregated from the other social sciences, its ambiguity concerning 
objectivity, and-especially as the academic era continued-the ever-
. present pessimism about technology's inevitable effects on human 
relations, made it difficult for European sociologists to communicate 
about or share in the general social commitment to development via the 
innovation of capital-intensive technologies. (Weinstein, 1982, p. 37) 
Especially by the turn of the 20th century, the subject and object of 
knowledge-social, scientific, and technological knowledge-were separated. 
With the means and machinery of technological change in place, and the 
social-scientific knowledge of social and technological ends removed and 
fragmented, the reification of technology was inevitable, accompanied by 
unanticipated and latent consequences which individuals did not attempt to 
accept responsibility for or comprehend. 
Sociology and Technology in the Early Twentieth Century United States 
Background and Development 
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Sociology did not begin to become institutionalized as a readily 
accepted separate academic discipline in the United States until 1892, when 
Albion Small set up the Department of Sociology at Chicago, although the 
University of Kansas had a department of Sociology in 1889, and various 
courses in different departments have been taught under the name of 
11sociology11 (or its equivalent) throughout the United States from 1854 on 
(Ritzer, 1988, pp. 165-166). As was the case in Europe, early reformers in the 
United States were also scientists, inventors, and social innovators (e.g., 
Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Edison, Alexander Graham Bell). However, the 
institutionalization of science, technology, and sociology in the United States 
took a somewhat different direction than that of Europe. The early founders of 
sociology in the United States were heavily influenced by Spencer•s idea of 
evolutionary progress (Ritzer, 1988). The group had an unusual range of 
backgrounds, drawing from positivism, populism, progressivism, and the social 
gospel (Weinstein, 1982, p. 45). On the other hand, science and technology 
merged in the United States and were institutionalized in institutes of 
technology such as MIT and also in large elite universities such as Columbia 
and Yale. The autonomy of pure research in science and technology is 
illustrated by the negative reactions to John Desmond BernaPs book The Social 
Function of Science published just before World War II. 
Bernal argued that the central government should be the source of 
funds for scientific research, and that these funds should be granted on 
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the basis of the expected social and political benefits. Most scientists 
were horrified by Bernal's proposals, which were contradictory to their 
cherished ideals. Scientists were committed to designing their own 
research without any regard to its immediate usefulness [i.e. 
consequences]. As late as 1937, the great physicist Ernest Rutherford 
could state that the work he and his colleagues were doing at 
. Cambridge University in nuclear physics had no conceivable practical 
value for anyone and he expressed delight that such was the case. Nor 
did university scientists drool over government grants, since many had 
independent incomes to help finance their still-inexpensive equipment 
and experiments. (McKay, Hill, & Buckler, 1983, p. 1108) 
Clearly, in the United States, sociology as a knowledge-based discipline was 
institutionalized well outside of scientific and technological knowledge, in spite 
of the fact that American sociology was decidedly 11scientific11 in the positivistic 
sense and well aware of the potentials of industrialization and technology, be 
they positive or negative. The influences of British sociology, particularly the 
social-evolutionary and progressive ideas of Spencer, predisposed American 
sociology to take on a traditional-liberal bent. 
Liberalism, taken to its extreme, comes very close to 
conservativism. The belief in social progress-in reform or a laissez-faire 
· doctrine-and the belief in the importance of the individual both lead to 
positions supportive of the system as a whole. The overriding belief is 
that the social system works or can be reformed to work. There is little 
criticism of the system as a whole; in the American case this means, in 
particular, that there is little question of capitalism. Instead of immanent 
class struggle, the early sociologists saw a future of class harmony and 
class cooperation. Ultimately this meant that early American sociological 
theory helped to rationalize exploitation, domestic and international 
imperialism, and social inequality. (Schwendinger & Schwendinger, 
1974, in Ritzer, 1988, p. 167) 
Ritzer concluded that 11ln the end, the political liberalism of the early sociologists 
had enormously conservative implications11 (Ritzer, 1988, p. 167). 
The separate institutionalization of science and technology with their 
laissez-faire autonomy, combined with the economic liberalism which formed 
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the foundation for early American institutionalized sociology were antithetical to 
an academic unity of American social thought, scientific knowledge, and 
technological knowledge. Unlike the earlier social philosophers, who treated 
social, scientific, and technological knowledge as an analytical whole, American 
academicians were specialists, bound to means-ends calculations and 
observations within their own limited pseudo-scientific paradigms. To question 
this institutional system and separation of knowledge would mean to question 
what was paradigmatically defined as 11progress,U which formed a large 
segment of American ideology and nationalism (and also posed a threat to 
those people whose interests financed the growth of the institutions 
themselves). 11Although these early sociologists were attracted to the ideas 
about dealing with the dangers of industrialization generated by the labor 
movement and socialist groups, they were not in favor of radically overhauling 
society11 (Ritzer, 1988, p. 167). This allowed for the growth of institutionalized 
sociology in the United States, but also hampered the acceptance of sociology 
as a viable 11scientific11 discipline. Science and technology, in early twentieth 
century America, were enjoying a position of high academic, social, and 
political status and esteem. The growth, differentiation, and specialization of 
American industry and the economy which, according to Spencerian theory, 
were characteristics of mature progressive social organisms, were credited to 
the advances of science and technology and to their operation outside of 
governmental interventions and controls. The ideal society, then, was one 
which was left alone to operate and evolve on its own outside of social, political, 
and economic controls, constraints, and reforms. 
In comparison to the non-social sciences, the technical fields, and even 
the better established social sciences such as economics and 
psychology-which nad no concern with criticizing the morality of the 
times, sociology was often identified as a reformist, 11concerned, 11 but 
impotent fringe of the academic community. (Weinstein, 1982, p. 46) 
While sociology remained on the fringes of, if not separated from, 
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mainstream institutional scientific and technological knowledge with its high 
regard and prestige, mainstream sociology also had its own 11fringes. 11 On this 
fringe was the eccentric yet brilliant son of poor Norwegian immigrants, 
Thorstein Bunde Veblen. Like Marx, Veblen, due in part to his unique situation 
in larger society, escaped the reins and limitations of the segmented and 
institutionalized academic disciplines. Consequently, Veblen set out to develop 
his own theory of technology and society. 
Veblen's Sociology of Technology 
Veblen was a scholar, scientist, positivist, and progressive thinker. One 
of his central themes was instincts, and one of the instincts he formed his 
theories around was the 11instinct of workmanship. 11 In the Instinct of 
Workmanship (1914) Veblen contended that the most important impulse, and 
most general impulse, in human nature is 
[the] drive to manipulate the world creatively with productive labor. 
Veblen maintained that its supreme importance lies in the fact that it is 
the instinct that facilitates the achievement of all the other adaptive 
instinctual drives. Its ends or goals are thus the survival of the human 
species. Thus the instinct of workmanship serves as a general drive for 
the achievement of goals that maintain life and permit social advance. 
For Veblen, as in the critical theories of Marx and Hegel, labor serves 
both adaptation and self-creation of categories of thought through which 
the world is understood, reflected on, and eventually changed. (Ashley 
& Orenstein, 1985, pp. 377-378) 
Another instinct, inevitably linked to technological knowledge and its 
objectivation, is idle curiosity. He linked this not only to the objectivation of 
technology, but also to the segmentation, institutionalization, and stratification 
of knowledge itself. 
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In essence, idle curiosity involves the insatiable desire for knowledge 
apart from any ulterior end and independent of any pragmatic or 
utilitarian motive. This human drive for knowledge leads to a constant 
disturbance of the habitual body of knowledge in any society. Thus, 
though 11idle11 (nonutilitarian) in origin, the instinct leads to an advance in 
knowledge, which provides the basis for technological improvement that 
ultimately underlies social evolutionary development. In The Higher 
Learning in America (1918), Veblen defended the independence of 
university faculty members from immediate applied or vocational 
endeavors forced on them by university administration. He did so by 
arguing that, by following the instinct of idle curiosity, the scholar will 
produce more of a benefit for society in the long run than by any other 
approach. Again, as with Hegel and Marx, true knowledge arises from 
an internal drive, and the passion for knowledge is undermined when it 
is made subservient to external instrumental logic. (Ashley & Orenstein, 
1985, p. 378) 
Veblen developed a class dichotomy between business interests and the 
free dissemination of technological knowledge by engineers and technicians. 
Veblen proposed a technocracy, not unlike the one envisioned by Saint-Simon 
in France a century earlier. He also foresaw an inevitable political struggle for 
the control of technological knowledge in which, left in the hands of business 
and monetary interests, could destroy the humanitarian foundations upon 
which progress was built and directed. 
The distinction between technical versus business classes is a radical 
one. It is a distinction that had been partly obscured by industrial 
society's [tendency] to equate development with capital accumulation. 
With the understanding that technological progress and the growth of 
business do not necessarily coincide, Veblen struck the core of the 
11problem with11 technology in the modern era: that its practice and 
practitioners had been subordinated to the will of the business 
enterprise. Veblen was not prepared to believe that the shape and 
effects of technological innovation must inevitably be tied to the 
accumulation of capital, even if the effects of such a relationship in 
prosperous time is good; nor, like Weber, did he believe that technology 
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inevitably contributes to increasing bureaucratization. On the contrary, 
he was concerned with freeing technology, with elevating it to a position 
where it would direct changes in industry and society as a whole. 
Anticipating later social critics of the Frankfurt School by nearly one-half 
century, Veblen envisioned a contemporary political struggle for control 
of technology in which a great deal is at stake. This is a struggle not 
between workers and owners but between the 11Engineers11 driven by a 
creative, scientific instinct and the 11Price System 11 driven by the need to 
accumulate wealth. Veblen's understanding of technology led him to 
pose a choice between reason and greed as alternative stimulants to 
development. (Weinstein, 1982, p. 47) 
Veblen had several other important insights which still influence our 
contemporary understandings of technology. In his Theory of the Leisure 
Class (1899) he 
[Veblen] illustrates how social customs and economic pressures had 
perverted technology: how a supposedly rational technological system 
can be organized to produce waste; how modern industrial technology 
can be employed not for the benefit of all but as the weapon of a 
11predatory11 class in competition for booty; and how the establishment of 
a society-wide R&D system has served not to satisfy human needs, but 
to supply a decades-long round of potlatches among the ruling classes. 
(Weinstein, 1982, pp. 48-49) 
Veblen proposed that social evolution is contingent upon the impartial 
accumulation and free dissemination of social, scientific, and technological 
knowledge. In fact, it is the combination of the human tendency toward 
sociability and the need to act on and experience the world based on the 
accumulation of human knowledge which makes society possible. 
Thus Veblen rejected the principle that humans are basically 
asocial or self-centered beings. In the course of biological evolution, in 
the long stage of savagery, humans developed basic instinctual drives to 
create, to identify with and benefit others, and to accumulate knowledge 
that provides for technological and social advance. Veblen maintained 
that these instincts, mediated by cultural norms and conscious 
intelligence, provide the foundation for both social organization and 
social evolution. (Ashley & Orenstein, 1985, p. 378) 
His ideas about the relationship between science, technology, and society 
combined with his scathing criticisms of the institutionalization, segmentation, 
and bastardization (i.e., failure to recognize the origins) of knowledge form a 
solid and enlightening theory of technology and society with many 
contemporary applications. 
The Chicago School began to wane circa the 1920s and 1930s as the 
primary representatives of institutionalized sociology. The discipline later (via 
the representatives of the Harvard School and conservative social thought) 
experienced a movement to reunite itself with scientific knowledge, especially 
with scientific methods. This did not mean a reunification of science, 
technology, and social thought, but for one member of the Chicago school, 
William F. Ogburn, it did inspire a theory about technology and society. 
Ogburn and Technology as the Impetus of Social Change 
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In his presidential address before the American Sociology Society in 
1929, the Chicago sociologist William F. Ogburn announced sociology's 
scientific coming-of-age and its exclusion of mere social do-gooders. 
This was also a personal confession for Ogburn, who had begun his 
career as a socialist and had gradually shifted to an emphasis on 
detached quantitative research and technological trends. (Collins & 
Makowsky, 1984, p. 193) 
Ogburn (1955) proposed that, as an independent variable, technology, i.e., 
material culture, changes faster than non-material culture; Ogburn is often 
criticized for being a 11technological determinist. 11 
Other thinkers [besides Marx] have emphasized material factors 
as causes of change. William Ogburn in the 1930s wrote extensively 
about the technological causes of social change in America. He argued 
that the advent of the automobile had changed American society in 
many ways: by increasing geographic mobility, by accelerating the 
growth of the suburbs, and by changing courtship customs (by 
removing them from the supervision of adults). In general, Ogburn1s 
argument is that material culture (technology) changes more rapidly than 
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nonmaterial aspects of culture (ideas, values, norms, ideologies). As a 
generalization I think it is debatable, but it is true that humans are often 
more willing to adopt new techniques and tools than to change their 
cultural values and traditions. He argues that there is often a 11cultural 
lag 11 between the nonmaterial culture and the material culture, which is a 
source of tension. (Harper, 1989, p. 57) 
Ogburn, and Harper's assessment of Ogburn1s theory, illustrates how 
technology in twentieth century America becomes almost indelibly reified into 
its material products and processes. Ogburn1s theory confused technology 
with its material products, and mistakenly treated the products as independent 
variables. In fact, technology as knowledge is a cultural phenomenon, and 
acts in a dialectical as opposed to a unilinear force in the process of social 
change. This was essentially Marx's theory of technology, and though Marx 
was rightfully labelled a materialist-specifically in terms of initiating social 
change-by Harper and others, the issue of being a determinist is not as readily 
defended. Ogburn's theory failed in that it hopelessly reified technology, i.e. 
confused it with its products, processes, and consequences, and ignored the 
aspects of technology's relationship to science and social philosophy [and its 
consequential explanatory potentials] as interwoven, interrelated, and 
interdependent bodies of knowledge . 
. This reification of technological knowledge pervaded American sociology 
well through the conservative era of the Harvard School and Ivy League, into 
the radical revivalism started by C. W. Mills in the 1950s and maturing in the 
1960s, up through the 11creative sociologies11 of the sixties and seventies (see 
Ritzer, 1988, for a more detailed discussion of these developments). Science 
and technology were then increasing in social importance and support with the 
advent of World War II, the development of the atomic bomb, and 11space race 11 
which pumped millions of dollars into applied scientific and technological 
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pursuits. This was done at the expense of the social sciences and served, tor 
the most part, to entrench the 11technology as applied science and engineering11 
mentality still characteristic of American academia and modern society (Whyte, 
1956). Within the institution, the rekindling of Marxist perspectives by C. W. 
Mills moved the topic of technology and its impacts into the sociological 
subdiscipline often called the Sociology of Work (see Mills, 1951). That 
discussion will be pursued in a later section. It is now necessary to return to 
Europe and examine how technology, particularly within the Frankfurt School, 
became a significant concern in the sociology of knowledge. 
Technology and the Sociology of Knowledge: Twentieth Century Europe 
Mannheim and the Growth of Critical Sociology 
Any discussion of the sociology of knowledge is ultimately grounded in 
the works and ideas of Karl Mannheim (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 11). 
Mannheim's primary concern was with ideology as a form of knowledge and 
the consequences of ideology as a form of knowledge in terms of the members 
of a given society. 
He [Mannheim] insisted that a sociology of knowledge was possible, 
that there was an association between the forms of knowledge and 
social structure, and that membership of particular groups conditioned 
belief. (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1988, p. 144) 
Mannheim sought to 11detach11 knowledge from its ideological and 
institutionalized constraints. He asserted that education of technicians, 
engineers, and social planners must include social prerogatives-a 11sense of 
the extensive and often dissimulated outcomes of innovation11 (Weinstein, 1982, 
p. 73). Mannheim proposed that civilization has entered a new technological 
era which necessitates social planning-the era of the stage of planning. 
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Earliest human societies are in the "stage of chance discovery." 
Their methods of dealing with the world consist of traditions, accidentally 
adopted and maintained because they work. . . . On this level of society, 
freedom means spontaneous physical action-the freedom to go where 
one pleases, to do what one wants when one wants to do it. The 
limitations of this freedom come primarily from the environment-wild 
animals, the weather, diseases, lack of food-which may keep human 
beings from being able to do everything they want. (Collins & 
Makowsky, 1984, p. 226) 
Herein one can observe how the knowledge of altering the environment to meet 
human needs, i.e., technology, can be considered as an independent variable 
in the development of societies. This becomes more clear in Collins and 
Makowsky's explication of Mannheim's stage of invention and stage of 
planning. 
More advanced civilization has reached the "stage of invention." 
People have learned to reflect on their world, to develop tools, crafts, 
machines, businesses, factories, and organizations. The new 
techniques and organizations free us from the hardships of nature, but in 
return we must give up much of our physical spontaneity. The self-
discipline of work with tools and in cooperation with others gives us 
much control over the physical environment, but it forces us to change 
our concept of freedom: It is no longer physical freedom to make one's 
own fortune by using tools and building one's business. It is the 
freedom of the inventor and intrepeneur. 
But if the stage of inventions gives us control over the physical 
environment, it puts us at the mercy of the social environment. What 
good is formal freedom to choose one's own work, says Mannheim, to a 
worker who is at the mercy of the shifting trends of the labor market? 
Accordingly, we find ourselves at the dawn of the "stage of planning," in 
which we give up the free activity of each entrepreneur and inventor to 
go his or her own way regardless of the consequences for others in 
return for a new sort of freedom: the freedom to control our social world 
instead of being controlled by it. Democracy can be preserved in 
planning by incorporating the safeguards and procedures of democracy 
into the plan itself. At least, such was Mannheim's hope. He had to be 
optimistic about planning, for he felt there was no other acceptable 
choice. (Collins & Makowsky, 1984, pp. 226-227) 
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What Mannheim appears to propose is a reactionary response to 
material and idedlogical 11progress11 in the technical sense: A return to the time 
when science, technology, and social thought were a unified body of 
knowledge free from institutional and ideological constraints yet rich with 
emancipatory intentions. Mannheim clearly identified the consequences of the 
separation and institutionalization of these bodies of knowledge. 
[The] contradiction [is] between the Enlightenment intention to use 
technology to set people free from bondage to tradition and nature and 
the current situation in fascist, communist, and mass societies alike in 
which technology serves to keep most people in bondage to the few 
political and technical elites. (Weinstein, 1982, p. 72) 
The sociology of knowledge approach to technology-identifying 
technology as a basis for ideological manipulation-became the central theme 
of the Frankfurt School, founded in Frankfurt, Germany, February 23, 1923 
(Ritzer, 1988, pp. 250-251 ). To the critical theorists of the Frankfurt school, 
technology embodied the formal rationalization of human objectified action. 
11To the critical theorists, formal rationality is concerned unreflectively with the 
question ofthe most effective means for achieving any purpose" (Tar, 1977, 
cited in Ritzer, 1988, p. 250). The rationalization of technological knowledge in 
absence of scientific and traditional emancipatory social guidelines then 
becomes technocratic thinking. 
[In technocratic thinking] the objective is to serve the forces of 
domination, not to emancipate people from domination. The goal is 
simply to find the most efficient means to whatever ends are defined as 
important by those in power. Technocratic thinking is contrasted to 
reason, which is, in the minds of the critical theorists, the hope for 
society. Reason involves the assessment of means in terms of the 
ultimate human values of justice, peace, and happiness. (Ritzer, 1988, 
p. 250) 
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Technology, in critical terms, is the most predominant form of formal rationality 
(Ritzer, 1988, p. 251). Formal rationality, in contemporary society, takes on an 
irrational form due to the fact that it is devoid of its "substantial" components. 
"The model of substantial rationality is a person thinking realistically, calculating 
so that his or her actions reach their intended goals" (Collins & Makowsky, 
1984, p. 225). Formal rationality is also devoid of those non rational 
components (i.e., phenomena not based on means-ends calculations at all) 
such as values, trust, or "precontractual solidarity" which form the bases for all 
rational action (Collins, 1982). Thus, technological knowledge in the absence 
of directive social and scientific knowledge can become decidedly irrational 
(i.e., following a means-ends path in which the means and ends are decidedly 
not complementary). In this sense, technology could be a very significant 
independent variable in the development of modern society. Of all the critical 
theorists, Herbert Marcuse most directly addressed the significance of 
technology as an important variable in social development (Marcuse, 1964; 
Ritzer, 1988, p. 251). 
Marcuse: A Critique of Technology, Knowledge, and Society 
In absence of his dialectical roots, Marcuse almost comes off as a 
technological determinist, although the rationale is considerably more 
sophisticated than that of, for example, Saint-Simon, or Ogburn. Given that 
man is in dialectical relation to nature-in fact an acting part of nature-Marcuse 
asserted that technology, as a form of knowledge, takes on an a priori 
dimension through its objectivation. 
The technological a priori is a political a priori inasmuch as the 
transformation of nature involves that of man, and in as much as the 
"man-made creations" issue from and re-enter a social ensemble. One 
may still insist that the machinery of the technological universe is "as 
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such11 indifferent towards political ends-it can revolutionize or retard a 
society. An electronic computer can serve equally a capitalist or social 
administration; a cyclotron can be an equally efficient tool for a war party 
or a peace party. This neutrality is contested in Marx's controversial 
statement that the 11hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the 
steam-mill society with the industrial capitalist. 11 And this statement is 
further modified in Marxian theory itself: the social mode of production, 
not technics, is the basic historical factor. However, when technics 
becomes the universal form of material production, it circumscribes an 
entire culture; it projects a historical totality-a 11world 11 • (Marcuse, 1964, 
p. 154) 
Marcuse pointed out the necessity of a technology which is 11indifferent11 
and simultaneously pointed out, that due to the objectivated nature of 
technological products and processes, the impossibility of such a 11neutral 11 form 
of knowledge. As Marx purported, technology can be emancipating as well as 
oppressive, but one can envision that such an emancipatory endeavor would, 
based on the analyses herein, involve the de-institutionalization of technology, 
the loosening of its ideological reins, and its reintegration with social-scientific 
humanitarian means and ends. It, according to Marcuse (1964), involves the 
explicit redirection of technological knowledge into conscious social-scientific 
efforts to create a better and less oppressive society. 
[Marcuse] saw technology in modern society as leading to 
totalitarianism. In fact, he viewed it as leading to new, more effective, 
and even more 11pleasant11 methods of external control over individuals. 
The prime example is the use of televisio·n to socialize and pacify the 
population (other examples are mass sports and sex). He rejected the 
idea that technology [in its objectivated form] is neutral in the modern 
world and saw it instead as a means to dominate people. It is effective 
because it is made to seem neutral when it is in fact enslaving. It serves 
to suppress individuality. The actor's inner freedom has been 11invaded 
and whittled down11 by modern technology. The result is what Marcuse 
called 11one-dimensional society11 in which individuals lose the ability to 
think critically and negatively about society. Marcuse did not see 
technology per se [i.e., technological knowledge] as the enemy, but 
rather technology as it is employed [i.e., objectivated] in modern 
capitalist society. . . . Marcuse retained Marx1s original view that 
technology is not inherently a problem and that it can be used to 
develop a 11better11 society. (Ritzer, 1988, p. 251) 
Habermas: A New Critical Direction? 
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Jurgen Habermas, the new leader of the Frankfurt School, interpreted 
the situation differently. In an analysis of Marx1s theory of historical materialism, 
Habermas (1979/1976) asserted that, in addition to innovations in productive 
techniques and refinements in technological knowledge, social evolution must 
ultimately be driven by refinements in normative integration, more precisely, in 
integrative communicative action. 
The postulated learning mechanism [in Marx's theory of the development 
of evolutionary innovations] explains the growth of a cognitive potential 
[i.e., knowledge] and perhaps its conversion into technologies and 
strategies that heighten productivity. It can explain the emergence of 
system problems that, when the structural dissimilarities between forces 
of production become too great, threaten the continued existence of the 
mode of production. But this learning mechanism does not explain how 
the problems that arise can be solved. The introduction of new forms of 
social integration-for example, the replacement of the kinship system 
with the state-requires knowledge of a moral-practical sort and not 
technically useful knowledge that can be implemented in rules of 
instrumental and strategic action. It requires not an expansion of our 
control over external nature but knowledge that can be embodied in 
structures of interaction-in a word, an extension of the autonomy of 
· society in relation to our own, internal nature. (Habermas, 1979/1976, 
pp. 145-146) 
Habermas asserted that social evolution is ultimately contingent upon emerging 
social structures and relations which are ultimately grounded in social 
communicative discourse. This thesis downplays the significance of 
technological knowledge in the social evolutionary process and negates the 
proposition that technology, in the form of knowledge, can be useful as an 
independent variable in explaining social change and social relationships. 
Habermas' point is well taken-increased cognitive potentials and 
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[the] endogenous growth of knowledge [are] thus a necessary condition 
of social evolution. But only when a new institutional framework has 
emerged can the as-yet unresolved system problems be treated with the 
help of the accumulated cognitive potential; from this there results an 
increase in productive forces. (Habermas, 1979/1976, p. 147) 
Habermas, then, appears to give primacy to cultural forces (i.e., in Marx's 
terminology, the superstructure) in instigating social change. 
Habermas' mode of analysis is similar to Marx's in that he sees 
social evolution as a result of crises or "contradictions" inherent in a 
given system. These create "steering problems," which eventually make 
the system untenable. However, like other critical theorists, Habermas 
emphasizes the role played by people's ideas and consciousness. 
Underlying structural changes and contradictions manifest themselves in 
the breakdown of shared values or "normative structures"; and the old 
social system disintegrates because such changes threaten people's 
feeling of social identity (and therefore social integration). (Wallace & 
Wolf, 1986, p. 104) 
Habermas' focus on ideas as the mechanism of social change 
makes his treatment very different from that of Marx, who treats the 
development of modern industry as a deus ex machina that catapulted 
mankind from feudal into capitalist society. (Wallace & Wolf, 1986, p. 
105) 
Additional Critique and Analysis 
The debate Habermas constructed resembles an antithesis to the one 
Marx undertook with Hegel concerning the nature of dialectic reasoning and 
the consequential origins of social change. However, such debate is nothing 
more than an exercise in futility and a negation of the dialectic method itself 
(OIiman, 1976). It appears quite clear that changes in both objective and 
subjective social phenomena are prerequisite to all large scale social change. 
Within the theoretical framework and assumptions herein, supported by more 
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modern attempts (e.g. Oilman, 1976; Ritzer, 1988) to understand the dialectic 
method, the necessary focus of analysis is on the reciprocal nature of opposing 
social phenomena, thus minimalizing the need (and opportunity) to make 
assertions about linear causation. What is sought herein is to explain the 
occurrence of latent socio-technological consequences; not to speculate as to 
the origin of all technological knowledge. For this purpose, the objective-
subjective dialectical debate is pointless; what matters is the process by which 
people mistake or give primacy to one or the other, i.e., the process of 
reification. The process of objectivation and the subsequent reification of 
technological knowledge into its own products and processes does not 
significantly differ from the process by which normative ideas become 
objectivated into language and symbols. The issue at hand is how these 
objectivations become 11things in themselves 11 which apparently operate outside 
of human understanding and controls, inevitably producing negative social 
outcomes. In the sense of what should be, Habermas proposed a promising 
solution-the free and open exchange of knowledge outside of political and 
ideological constraints. However, as Marcuse points out, material culture, 
specifically technological culture, is indelibly and ominously attached to the 
symbols and meanings people share. John Dewey, perhaps, best pointed out 
the real necessity of the integration of scientific, social, and technological 
knowledge through objectivated action and experience: 
Aforetime man employed the results of his prior experience only to form 
customs that henceforth had to be blindly followed or blindly broken. 
Now, old experience is used to suggest aims and methods for 
developing a new and improved experience. Consequently experience 
becomes in so far constructively self-regulated. . . . The very fact of 
experience thus includes the process by which it directs itself in its own 
betterment. 
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Science, 11reason 11 is not therefore something laid from above 
upon experience. Suggested and tested in experience, it is also 
employed through inventions in a thousand ways to expand and enrich 
experience. Although, as has often been repeated, this self-creation and 
self-regulation of experience is still largely technological rather than truly 
artistic or human, yet what has been achieved contains the guaranty 
[sic] of the possibility of an intelligent administering of experience. The 
.limits are moral and intellectual, due to defects in our good will and 
knowledge. They are not inherent metaphysically in the very nature of 
experience. 11Reason 11 as a faculty separate from experience, introducing 
us to a superior region of universal truths begins now to strike us as 
remote, uninteresting and unimportant. Reason, as a Kantian faculty 
that introduces generality and regularity into experience, strikes us more 
and more as superfluous-the unnecessary creation of men addicted to 
traditional formalism and to elaborate terminology. Concrete 
suggestions arising from past experiences, developed and matured in 
the light of the [material and ideational] needs and deficiencies of the 
present, employed as aims and methods of reconstruction and tested by 
success or failure in accomplishing this task of readjustment, suffice. To 
such empirical suggestions used in constructive fashion for new ends 
the name intelligence is given. (Dewey, 1968/1920, pp. 95-96) 
The Frankfurt School maintains an emancipatory agenda and is 
concerned with the ways in which knowledge itself is manipulated, stratified, 
and used as means of oppression by socio-political elites. In Italy, Antonio 
Gramsci, somewhat prior to Habermas, also criticized Marx for his economic 
and materialist tendencies, asserting the importance of ideological 
considerations. However, Gramsci also accorded significance to the 
objectivated experiences of the oppressed. 
The stability of capitalist societies was mostly dependent on the 
ideological domination of the working class [i.e., hegemony]. Gramsci 
suggested that this domination could not be complete, however, for the 
working class has a dual consciousness, one part of which is imposed 
by the capitalist class while the other part is a commonsense knowledge 
derived from the workers' everyday experience of the world. 
(Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1988, p. 107) 
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In France, Louis Althusser took Gramsci's notion of ideology a step further, 
proposing that it forms an inherently objective material condition which 
mechanically reproduces the social relations of production, specifically through 
the institutions of education and mass media (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 
1988, p. 1 O). Thus, European sociology, either through the sociology of 
knowledge, critical sociology, or the subject-object dialectic was concerned 
with technology, its impacts, and implications within the larger social milieu. 
However, with few exceptions (e.g. Marcuse), the distinction between 
technology as a form of knowledge, its institutionalized, segmented, and reified 
forms, its processes, products, and explanatory potentials, are not sufficiently 
developed such that one can use the concept in empirical sociological analyses 
or explanation. Some of the concepts, however, kindled an interest in these 
issues for an American sociologist in the post-war era, namely, C. W. Mills. 
Mills examined technological products, processes, and relationships in the 
workplace and sought to demonstrate their oppressive implications. This 
analytical focus has become a popular approach in sociology since the post-
war period of the United States, particularly since the 11radical revolution 11 
precipitated by Mills in the 1960s. 
The Treatment of Technology in Contemporary American Sociology 
C. W. Mills, Technology, Alienation, and Deskilling 
C. W. Mills saw technological rationality as a core variable in 11modern 
occupational change 11 (Mills, 1951, p. 66). Technological rationality, according 
to Mills, is visible in three trends. These include (a) the increase of productivity 
through mass-production processes and techniques, (b) an increased focus on 
marketing and the necessity of artificially increasing demand, and (c) 
consequential shifts in the social relations of production such that the 
proportion of white-collar to manual laborers increases while the autonomy of 
white collar work and workers decreases (Mills, 1951 ). Mills pointed out that 
technological 11know-how, 11 occupational skills, and the social relations of 
production are interrelated. 
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Technology has thus narrowed the stratum of workers needed for 
given volumes of output; it has also altered the types and proportions of 
skill needed in the production process. Know-how, once an attribute of 
the mass of workers, is now in the machine and the engineering elite 
who design it. Machines displace unskilled workmen, make craft skills 
unnecessary, push up front the automatic motions of the machine 
operative. (Mills, 1951, p. 67) 
One issue that Mills introduced to his audience is the question of 
deskilling. The deskilling assertion contends that the degree of manual skill 
required to perform most jobs has decreased with the introduction of new 
technologies and increased managerial controls. The debate on this question 
still continues today. What Mills contributed most to the debate is the 
realization that skills are inextricably contingent upon knowledge, most 
specifically, technological knowledge. Technological rationality since the Civil 
War has altered the nature of skills such that the know-how of production has 
become increasingly invested in machinery, abstract technological processes, 
and rational bureaucratic organizations. This results in a labor force in which 
"fewer individuals manipulate things, more handle people and symbols" (Mills, 
1951, p. 65). As workers deal with increasingly abstract products, the potential 
for alienation from these products appears to increase, as does the reification 
of the associated technological knowledge by which the products and 
processes are made possible. Skill as know-how tends to become abstracted 
from the worker and invested in the organization. Mills pointed out that 
deskilling, per se, is not the issue; it is the control of the technological 
knowledge itself that determines the social character of work in modern 
industrial societies. 
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Mills concluded that technological rationality, with its accompanying 
oppressive manipulations, makes possible the centralization and sedimentation 
of power in an elite economic few. To Mills, it was not technological processes 
and products that determined the social relations of production, nor was it 
technological know-how and knowledge that accorded power to the individual. 
Power is derived from the stratification of this technological knowledge, such 
that the outcomes of the technological process, product, and experience are 
removed from the worker and reinvested in the rationalized organizational 
power structure itself. This structure then can become a reified piece of 
machinery outside of perceived individual rationality, responsibility, and control. 
This is accomplished through a hierarchical control over the dissemination of 
technological knowledge, the manipulation of technical processes, and the 
removal of the worker from the product and other meaningful organizational 
affiliations. 
The detailed division of labor means, of course, that the individual 
does not carry through the whole process of work to its final product; 
but it also means that under many modern conditions the process itself 
is invisible to him. The product as the goal of his work is legally and 
psychologically detached from him, and this detachment cuts the nerve 
of meaning which work might otherwise gain from its technical 
processes. Even on the professional levels of white-collar work, not to 
speak of wage-work and the lower white-collar tasks, the chance to 
develop and use individual rationality is often destroyed by the 
centralization of decision and the formal rationality that bureaucracy 
entails. The expropriation that modern work organization has carried 
through thus goes far beyond the expropriation of ownership; rationality 
itself has been expropriated from work and any total view and 
understanding of its process. No longer free to plan his work, much 
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less to modify the plan to which he is subordinated, the individual is to a 
great extent managed and subordinated in his work .... [The] 
enterprise is an impersonal and alien Name, and the more that is placed 
in it, the less is placed in man. (Mills, 1951, pp. 225-226) 
Technological rationality and knowledge then, according to Mills, are 
intentionally removed from the work process and workers by an elite minority of 
owners and managers. The result is worker alienation and the removal of 
individually-guided rational action from the process and product of work. In 
this scenario, technological knowledge is used to oppress workers and to 
maintain a stratified social division of labor to the benefit of an elitist few. 
In an impersonalized and more anonymous system of control, 
explicit responses are not so possible: anxiety is likely to replace fear; 
insecurity to replace worry. The problem is who really has power, for 
often the tangled and hidden system seems a complex yet organized 
irresponsibility. When power is delegated from a distant center, the one 
immediately over the individual is not so different from the individual 
himself; he does not decide either, he too is part of the network by 
means of which individuals are controlled. (Mills, 1951, p. 349) 
Mills offered a comprehensive analysis of the dimensions of this 
problem, yet he was somewhat deficient in proposing solutions. He pointed 
out that technological and social knowledge are stratified by elitists who use 
various dimensions of the technological process to separate social and 
technological bodies of knowledge for the purpose of altering the social 
relations of production to their own benefit. This results in a gap between the 
objective and subjective conditions of social reality for most individuals: First, 
individual action can no longer be rationally self-directed, and second, the 
experience of one1s own character is no longer consistent with or 
complementary to the imposed social structure in which it must exist. This 
inevitably results in alienation and fragmentation of the social self. 
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Mills hurdled an intellectual milestone in identifying important sociological 
variables such as technological rationality (i.e. knowledge), technical process, 
human directed action, relations of production, objective conditions, and 
human experiences such as alienation. Unfortunately, in this particular effort, 
the complex interrelationships are not as well-developed as they could be. 
Mills' greatest contribution to American sociology may have been the very fact 
that he challenged the right wing conservative bent sociology had taken during 
the forties and fifties (Ritzer, 1988). This laid the foundation for the spread of 
critical sociology in the United States and suggested that the sociological 
agenda should include a questioning and critique of traditional American 
institutions and ideology. Particularly in the areas of alienation and on the 
question of deskilling, Mills spurred a growing interest in the relationship 
between social organization, work, and self. 
Technology, Alienation, and Freedom: Robert Blauner 
Robert Blauner wrote what may still be the landmark study of technology 
and its effects on the modern worker. Blauner sought 11 [to bring together] two 
modes of inquiry that have usually stayed somewhat apart-the abstract, even 
philosophical, speculation of the alienation concept, and empirical research, 
with its sensitivity to concrete social life and scientific procedures11 (Blauner, 
1964, p. vii). Blauner acknowledged an intellectual debt to Marx, but 
suggested that it may be overly simplistic to conclude that the capitalist mode 
of production inevitably leads to alienation. Upon examination of various 
empirical sources, including a 1947 Roper-Fortune Survey on worker 
satisfaction, combined with his own collected data, Blauner observed a 
relationship between the context of work performed and respondents' 
perceptions of satisfaction. According to Blauner, the primary variable 
influencing this relationship was technology. 
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The most important single factor that gives an industry a 
distinctive character is its technology. Technology refers to the complex 
of physical objects and technical operations (both manual and machine) 
regularly employed in turning out the goods and services produced by 
an industry. Technology signifies primarily the machine system, the level 
and type of mechanization, but it also includes the technical "know 
how11and mechanical skills involved in production. (Blauner, 1964, p. 6) 
Using this rather limited definition of technology, Blauner then proceeded 
to correlate technology with alienation. An important distinction made is that 
alienation has both objective and subjective components. This treatment of 
alienation may have been Blauner1s strongest argument. 
Alienation is a general syndrome made up of a number of different 
objective conditions and subjective feeling-states which emerge from 
certain relationships between workers and the sociotechnical settings of 
employment. Alienation exists when workers are unable to control their 
immediate work processes, to develop a sense of purpose and function 
which connects their jobs to the overall organization of production, to 
belong to integrated industrial communities, and when they fail to 
become involved in the activity of work as a mode of personal self-
expression. In modern industrial employment, control, purpose, social 
integration, and self-involvement are all problematic. (Blauner, 1964, p. 
15) 
11Sociotechnical settings11 appears to have included subjective feeling-states of 
social actors, technological processes, technological products, and the 
experience of the self through these settings. A potential for alienation 
hypothetically exists at each social moment of the sociotechnical setting which 
is unique to each industry. Blauner then conceptualized alienation as having 
four dimensions. These include (a) powerlessness, (b) meaninglessness, (c) 
social alienation, and (d) self-estrangement. Apparently unknowingly, Blauner 
identified reification of technological knowledge as a source of this alienation. 
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Thus the four modes of alienation reflect different 11splits11 in the 
organic relationship between man and his existential experience: the 
subject-object, the part-whole, the individual-social, and the present-
future dichotomies. Each makes it more possible to use people as a 
means rather than as ends. Since 11things11 rather than human beings are 
normally used as means, alienation tends to turn people into things: 
thus thingness, in addition to fragmentation, is another common 
denominator of the various meanings of alienation. (Blauner, 1964, p. 
33) 
By definition, reification means to "make something thing-like" (Abercrombie, 
Hill, & Turner, 1988, p. 205). What Blauner attempted to infer was that the 
objective components of human action and experience tended to become 
removed (i.e., reified) from the subjective components. This treatment of 
alienation, then, also took on a decidedly dialectical characteristic, utilizing 
traditional dichotomies (i.e., subject-object, part-whole) common to the writings 
of Kant, Hegel, Marx, etc. The passage also can illustrate the trend toward 
ever-more rational-technical thought in its reference to means-ends 
calculations. Of course, Blauner1s message was that such rationality is 
dialectically contingent upon the technology which supports it. However, he 
insightfully pointed out that the by-product of such rationality is the 
fragmentation of individual experience. 11The result of being a means for the 
ends of others is that for himself, his (own) activity becomes only a means 
rather than a fulfilling end" (Blauner, 1964, p. 33). 
The core of Blauner1s empirical work was to explicate the differences in 
alienation from one form of technology to the next. This was done through the 
empirical examination of four different industries including (a) printing and craft 
industries, (b) textile and machine-tending industries, (c) automobile and 
assembly-line industries, and finally, (d) chemical plant and continuous-process 
industries. Simply put, Blauner concluded that perceived alienation was 
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greatest in those industries that located skill, control, and knowledge outside of 
the individual, namely, the textile (machine-tending) and automobile (assembly 
line) industries. Workers felt least alienated in industries where they perceived 
they had adequate control over the work and product, i.e., craft and continuous 
process industries. 
Inherent in the techniques of modern manufacturing and the principles of 
bureaucratic industrial organization are generally alienating tendencies. 
But in some cases the distinctive technology, division of labor, economic 
structure, and social organization-in other words, the factors that 
differentiate individual industries-intensify these general tendencies, 
producing a high degree of alienation; in other cases they minimize and 
counteract them, resulting instead in [feelings of] control, meaning, and 
integration. (Blauner, 1964, pp. 166-167) 
Blauner identified several variables to consider when conducting 
empirical investigations about the nature of work and alienation in modern 
industrial societies. These included technological processes, products, the 
division of labor, and the social relations of production inherent to any particular 
industry. Blauner did not develop these relationships very extensively nor offer 
any clear analytical framework for understanding how these variables affect one 
another. Furthermore, technological, scientific, and social structures also exist 
and must be understood outside of the workplace. Blauner, for the most part, 
ignored the alienating potential and implications of larger industrial society itself. 
However, this formed the foundation for his call for further empirical research: 
Finally, I have also attempted to demonstrate the usefulness of 
the alienation perspective in clarifying our understanding of the 
complexities of the modern social world. The idea, developed by Marx 
in his early writings, can be expressed in systematic concepts and 
propositions that raise important analytical, as well as sociopolitical, 
questions. I hope to have shown that these questions can be partially 
answered through empirical research (especially of a comparative 
nature) without eliminating the humane value orientation that has 
informed the historic usage of this body of thought, for the moral power 
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inherent in the alienation tradition has been its view of man as 
potentiality. A social scientist must emphasize a sober, non-romantic 
understanding of man as he is , in terms of present levels of aspirations 
and achievements. But we cannot assume that men are only what they 
are at present or what they themselves desire to become. There is a 
need to fuse an empirical, realistic approach with the valuable humanistic 
tradition of alienation theory that views all human beings as being 
potentially capable of exercising freedom and control, achieving 
meaning, integration, social connection, and self-realization. There is 
always a strain between empirical tough-mindedness and human 
relevance in social research, and in such areas as the study of alienation 
in work it is especially essential that this conflict be overcome. (Blauner, 
1964, p. 187) 
One might conclude, as Blauner did, that the social implications and 
context of rapid technological change mandate further empirical research for 
the purpose of better understanding 11the complexities of the modern social 
world 11 (Blauner, 1964, p. 187). One might also conclude that additional 
analytical questions and problems still remain. One final criticism of Blauner is 
that this social world he spoke of is much broader than the world of industrial 
production-the question arises whether these variables have any implications 
for everyday social existence. Even so, Blauner built a firm intellectual 
foundation upon which the task of empirical and analytical clarification can be 
further pursued. This thesis continues on that path. 
Technocracy Revisited: Bell's Post-industrial Society 
Daniel Bell saw technology as the underpinning of a new social-political 
order. The crux of Bell's thesis is that the axes of stratification in contemporary 
post-industrial society will be based more on knowledge and less on property 
(Bell, 1976, p. 374). He identified four estates which will compete for political 
power in this society, specifically, (a) scientific, (b) technological, (c) 
administrative, and (d) cultural. 
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While [these] estates, as a whole, are bound by a common ethos, there 
is no intrinsic interest that binds one to the other, except for a common 
defense of the idea of learning, in fact there are large disjunctions 
between them. The scientific estate is concerned with the pursuit of 
basic knowledge and seeks, legitimately, to defend the conditions of 
such pursuit, untrammeled by political or extraneous influence. The 
technologists, whether engineers, economists, or physicians, base their 
work on a codified body of knowledge, but in the application of that 
knowledge to social or economic purposes they are constrained by the 
policies of the different situses they are obedient to. The administrative 
estate is concerned with the management of organizations and is bound 
by the self-interest of the organization itself (its perpetuation and 
aggrandizement) as well as the implementation of social purposes, and 
may come into conflict with one or another of the estates. The cultural 
estate-artistic and religious-is involved with the expressive symbolism 
(plastic or ideational) of forms and meanings, but to the extent that it is 
extensively concerned with meanings, it may find itself increasingly 
hostile to the technological and administrative estates. . . . Thus in the 
post-industrial society one finds increasingly a disjunction between 
[technical-rational] social structure and [antinomian and anti-institutional] 
culture which inevitably affects the cohesiveness if not the corporate 
consciousness of the four estates. (Bell, 1976, p. 376) 
. Bell identified a growing technical-rational trend in industrial societies, 
culminating in the supremacy of scientific and technical occupations which 
would constitute a new class. Bell refuted Saint-Simon1s conception of 
technocracy, and instead substituted a vision of a society in which scientific and 
technological knowledge laid the foundation for a 1true11 meritocracy. In spite of 
citing several problems with such a knowledge-based social hierarchy (e.g., 
bureaucratization of science, antinomian dissent, increasing difficulty 
maintaining consensus) Bell painted an optimistic picture of the post industrial 
society. Particularly, the aspect of humankind1s release from the limitations of 
nature and materialism. 
For most of human history, reality was nature, and in poetry and 
imagination men sought to relate the self to the natural world. Then 
reality became technics, tools and things made by men yet given an 
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independent existence outside himself, the reified world. Now realitv is 
primarily the social world-neither nature nor things, only men-
experienced through the reciprocal consciousness of self and other. 
Society itself becomes a web of consciousness, a form of imagination to 
be realized as a social construction. Inevitably, a post-industrial society 
gives rise to a new Utopianism, both engineering and psychedelic. Men 
can be remade or released, their behavior conditioned or their 
consciousness altered. The constraints of the past vanish with the end 
of nature and things. (Bell, 1976, p. 488) 
Bell's utopian forecast is reminiscent of Hegel's Weltgeist, or that of 
universal reason or consciousness. However, such a conclusion, as critiqued 
earlier; is a teleological fallacy. Dialectically, reason and knowledge are 
inseparable from the subject-object interfaces of human action and experience. 
Granted, people inevitably construct social reality, but not independently of the 
larger social context diagrammed earlier in this manuscript. Bell identified 
technological knowledge as an important variable in sociological analyses, but 
failed to explain the process by which this knowledge operates to generate 
social consequences. In fact, Bell's vision appears very similar to the elitist 
ideology of Saint-Simon which he took such care to critique. Harry Braverman 
suggested that Bell is typical of most academic sociologists "[who write about] 
occupations, work, skills, etc. without even bare familiarity" (Braverman, 1974, 
p. 106). Bell tended to reify all forms of knowledge and ignore the objective 
conditions and social relations which create and maintain human knowledge 
and experience. Braverman, in the Marxian tradition, asserted that 
technological and scientific knowledge can also be utilized by economic elites 
to maintain control and power over workers. In addition, this knowledge is not 
then experienced by workers as Utopian freedom, but instead, as alienation 
and oppression. 
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Braverman, Technology, and the Social Relations of Production 
· Harry Braverman, like many of the contemporary sociologists examining 
the social implications and conditions of work, credited Marx as a primary 
reference in his theoretical foundation. Braverman was specifically concerned 
with the relationship between technological processes and ownership and 
control of the means of production. His primary campaign was one in 
opposition to crass technological determinism, of which he saw Bell as a 
proponent. 
[The] tendency of modern social science is to accept all that is real as 
necessary, all that exists as inevitable, and thus the present mode of 
production as eternal. In its most complete form, this view appears as a 
veritable technological determinism: the attributes of modern society 
are seen as issuing directly from smokestacks, machine tools, and 
computers. We are, as a result, presented with a theory of a societas ex 
machina, not only a determinism, but a despotism of the machine. 
(Braverman, 1974, p. 16) 
Note that although Braverman claimed to make a distinction between 
technological processes and products, this distinction was not well developed. 
However, in terms of process, he did offer an analysis of how people come to 
see machines as independent and separate from their makers. owners, and 
operators. Braverman again drew from Marx in his analysis of how this 
phenomena comes about. 
It has become fashionable, however, to attribute to machinery the 
powers over humanity which arise in fact from social relations. Society, 
in this view, is nothing but an extrapolation of science and technology, 
and the machine itself is the enemy. The machine, the mere product of 
human labor [processes] and ingenuity [i.e., knowledge], designed and 
constructed by humans and alterable by them at will, is viewed as an 
independent participant in human social arrangements. It is given life, 
· enters into the 11relations11 with the workers, relations fixed by its own 
nature, is endowed with the power to shape the life of mankind, and is 
sometimes even invested with designs upon the human race. This is the 
reification of a social relation; it is ... nothing but a fetishism. in Marx's 
sense of the term. (Braverman. 1974. p. 229) 
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Unfortunately, Braverman left these rich insights behind and pursued a 
treatise on how technological processes are primarily a function of the capitalist 
mode of production with the implicit goal of exerting control over work and 
workers. This. according to Braverman. is accomplished through the deskilling 
of jobs and intentional alienation and subordination of workers. The majority of 
Braverman's analysis involved how the objective conditions of work serve to 
maintain capitalist domination over the worker. Braverman concluded that 
technological knowledge and control must be restored to the worker if social 
democracy and freedom are to be maintained; recent attempts at "workplace 
democracies" cannot substitute for the larger social democratic reality. 
Without the return of requisite technical knowledge to the mass of 
workers and the reshaping of the organization of labor-without, in a 
word, a new and truly collective mode of production-balloting within 
factories and offices does not alter the fact that the workers remain as 
dependent as before upon 11experts, 11 and can only choose among them, 
or vote for alternatives presented by them. Thus genuine workers' 
control has as its prerequisite the demystifying of technology and the 
reorganization of the mode of production. (Braverman. 1974, p. 445) 
Braverman correctly concluded that social and technological knowledge 
and processes are indelibly intertwined. Most enlightening. though poorly 
developed, is the idea that this knowledge becomes reified and becomes 
fetishisms, i.e., abstract social relations which mistakenly (though possibly 
intentionally) come to be seen as separate from human knowledge and action. 
and subsequently become experienced as part of the objective material world. 
This is particularly problematic for workers in a monopoly capitalist economy 
where it is to the benefit of the capitalist to support and maintain such 
reifications and fetishisms for their own benefit. In light of Braverman's 
analyses, Bell's technological meritocracy seems only an oxymoron phrase. 
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Even given Braverman's strong analytical foundation upon which to build 
further analyses, the same criticisms made of Blauner can be made of 
Braverman. Monopoly capitalism is not a social relation limited to workers and 
laborers. The range and scope of technological, social, and scientific 
knowledge exceeds that of the common workplace. Can the concepts of 
alienation, reification, and fetishisms extend to the individual, family, or other 
social institutions? In a world where knowledge grows exponentially, 
particularly technological knowledge, what then becomes the larger social 
implications and impacts of these phenomena? Braverman rightfully 
suggested that a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between 
social, scientific, and technological knowledge, process, products, and 
experiences be undertaken. 
Edwards and the Transformation of the Workplace 
Richard Edwards also asserted that control over work and workers is the 
primary function of technology in a monopoly capitalist society. He initially 
proposed, like Braverman, that alienation in the workplace results from a long 
history of capitalist social relations and the mode of production. 
The change [in the workplace] does not reflect inevitable consequences 
of modern technology or of industrial society, but rather ... the 
transformation occurred because continuing capital accumulation has 
propelled workers and their employers into virtually perpetual conflict. 
And while both technology and the requirements of modern social 
production play a part in the story ... the roots of this conflict lie in the 
basic arrangements of capitalist production. (Edwards, 1979, p. 1 O) 
Edwards outlined two broad types of emerging workplace structural controls 
which superseded the 11simple11 oppressive controls of the early small 
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entrepreneurs. The first is technical control, which involves designing control 
mechanisms into the technological process of production. The second is 
bureaucratic control, which brings the social structure into play by creating and 
enforcing hierarchical knowledge and decision structures. This bureaucratic 
control inevitably evolves into an institutionalized social structure of workplace 
' 
relations (Edwards, 1979, pp. 20-21 ). 
· The typology of control embodies both the patterns of historical 
evolution and the array of contemporary methods of organizing work. 
On the one hand, each form of control corresponds to a definite stage in 
the development of the representative or most important firms; in this 
sense structural control succeeded simple control and bureaucratic 
control succeeded technical control, and the systems of control 
correspond to or characterize stages of capitalism. On the other hand, 
capitalist production has developed unevenly, with some sectors 
pushing far in advance of other sectors, and so each type of control 
represents an alternative method of organizing work; so long as uneven 
development produces disparate circumstances, alternate methods will 
exist. (Edwards, 1979, p. 21) 
Edwards went to great lengths to describe the transition of the western 
economy into monopoly capitalism. Most important, according to Edwards, 
was the Marxian notion that labor must become and remain a commodity, 
subject only to the profitability of the controlling capitalists. Edwards 
reasserted, after Braverman, that the social relations of production inevitably 
influence, if not dictate, the types of control employed, particularly technical 
controls. 
How something is produced is in large part dictated, of course, 
by the nature of the product and by the known and available 
technologies for producing [it]. 
It is well known that most industries confront a variety of possible 
techniques, and that relative costs of required inputs will influence which 
is [chosen]. 
What is less well known is that there is also an important social 
element in the development and choice of technique. Firms confront a 
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range of techniques that differ not only with respect to required inputs, 
but also in the possibilities for control over their workforce. A superior 
technology may be one that facilitates the transformation of the firm1s 
labor power into useful labor, even if that technology entails a larger bill 
for other inputs or even a larger wage bill per hour of operation. 
(Edwards, 1979, pp. 111-112) 
Put more simply, Edwards proposed that the technique (technological 
process) most often chosen is the one that consistently elicits the greatest 
amount of work out of each worker. This is what Edwards called technical 
control and, following Marx, was described as 11designing machinery and 
planning the flow of work to minimize the problem of transforming labor power 
into (commodified] labor as well as to maximize the purely physically based 
possibilities for achieving efficiencies11 (Edwards, 1979, p. 112). Often, this 
involves removing the knowledge and control of the technical process from the 
worker and embedding them in the structure of the organization and work 
process itself. 
Technical control emerges only when the entire production process of 
the plant or large segments of it are based on a technology that paces 
and directs the labor process. When that happens, the pacing and 
direction of work transcend the individual workplace and are thus 
beyond the power of even the immediate boss; control becomes truly 
structural. (Edwards, 1979, p. 113) 
Not only does this restructuring of work and workplace controls create 
gaps between a worker1s knowledge, action, and experience, but the situation 
tends to result in what Edwards called the 11mystification11 of technology. In 
other words, the workers tend to 11fight the line11 or 11beat the clock11 and lose 
track of the fact that the technology is first and foremost a product and process 
of directed human knowledge. 
In this dazzle of new technology the workers are almost lost from 
sight. With their activities and productivity constantly being directed and 
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monitored by the computer hierarchy, workers find even less opportunity 
to exercise and control over their work lives. Their immediate oppressor 
becomes the programmed control device, the programming department, 
the printout-in short, the technology of production. In this environment, 
the human hierarchy and the capitalist organization of production that 
has produced the technology appear to recede. Control becomes truly 
structural, embedded in that hoary old mystification, technology. 
(Edwards, 1979, p. 125) 
One might be quick to criticize Edwards in the same fashion as Blauner 
and Braverman-the analysis is useful in understanding workplace 
relationships, but what of the larger social milieu? Edwards was also willing to 
extend his arguments to more general arenas. 
The rise of technical and bureaucratic control inside the core 
corporations altered the way in which core firms recruit, direct, evaluate, 
motivate, and discipline their workforces. These two forms of control, 
and the residual simple control in forms of the competitive periphery, all 
give rise to distinct labor market processes; indeed, when combined 
with the economic manifestations of racism and sexism, these forces 
have led historically to the segmentation of labor markets. The 
institutionalization of these various forces in the operation of segmented 
labor markets has in turn created the material basis for enduring 
divisions or fractions within the working class. This process has created, 
as distinct elements [sic], the working poor, the traditional proletariat, 
and the middle layers. Enduring divisions by race and sex create further 
and overlapping fractions of black workers and female workers. Each of 
these groups remains subject to the yoke of capitalist employment, yet 
each also experiences that employment under different concrete 
conditions. Since these differences have been institutionalized in the 
economic structure of society, and more fundamentally since they serve 
the needs of capital accumulation, they persist. (Edwards, 1979, p. 197) 
Edwards saw technology (i.e., technique) as a means by which 
economic elites maintain control over the rest of the workforce, and 
subsequently, over the lower echelons of the economic population. Although 
he addressed the 11mystification11 of technology, i.e., the aspect of the reification 
of technology, he did not really develop how technological knowledge differed 
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from technique or product. Unlike Mannheim and Marcuse, Edwards did not 
address how the stratification of technological knowledge acts to create and 
maintain power and authority structures. Unlike Weber and Marx, Edwards did 
not develop the concept that power (and authority) are dialectically contingent 
upon legitimation and belief structures upheld by the oppressed themselves. 
Such a distinction is necessary if technical and bureaucratic control structures 
are to be studied as part of a larger intersubjective social structure. 
Nonetheless, Edwards offers yet another insight into how technology can be 
utilized to effect other social and scientific ends, often resulting in the latent 
experience of alienation by other individuals. Edwards analyzed the 
transformation of the workplace in terms of technical and bureaucratic controls. 
Harley Shaiken (1986, p. xi) raises the next question: 11The technical potential of 
this transformation in production-higher productivity, better quality, and 
increased flexibility-is far reaching and widely heralded. But, what about the 
social implications?11 
Shaiken and the Technological Transformation of Work and Society 
Harley Shaiken witnessed technological changes in the workplace 
firsthand as a skilled machinist. Now an associate professor and well-
recognized analyst of trends in the automobile industry, he offered a very 
insightful challenge to the 11neutrality and inevitability11 of the 11hidden ways in 
which technology shapes our lives11 (Shaiken, 1986, p. ix). Though his primary 
focus was on computer technology in the workplace, he also was sensitive to 
the effects of technology on the human condition in general. 
[Far reaching] technological changeover raises some pivotal questions 
that affect the entire society. Since any advanced industrial economy is 
heavily dependent on manufacturing, changes of this significance in the 
technology of production are bound to have repercussions far beyond 
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the factory walls. For example, will these new technologies spur 
economic growth and the creatior, of new jobs or will they be introduced 
in a way that decimates employment? Will automation free workers from 
soul-destroying work or will it lay the basis for subordinating people to 
machines in a new and degrading way? Will computerization be used to 
rebuild the nation1s industrial base or will it facilitate the ability of 
multinational corporations to operate independently of any given 
country? (Shaiken, 1986, p. 3) 
Shaiken1s thesis is that technology is both a human choice and, 
simultaneously, an antecedent for new choices. What becomes problematic, 
according to Shaiken, is when the control of these choices is removed from the 
people which they affect. In the workplace, this is done through two 
processes. These processes are (a) complete automation, which removes 
physical human input from the technical process of work and, (b) deskilling, or 
the removal of knowledge and decision making from the technical process of 
work (Shaiken, 1986, p. 5). The real strength of Shaiken1s argument is in his 
treatment of sociological and technological choices. 11Unfortunately, technical 
possibilities and social purposes do not come in neatly labeled packages but 
are often intertwined in a complex and rapidly changing environment. ... 
Moreover, the development of technology is a dynamic process that changes in 
response to the environment" (Shaiken, 1986, pp. 10-11). This is as good a 
statement as any other so far in outlining the interrelationships of technology 
and society. 
Shaiken saw and clearly delineated human knowledge, choices, action, 
and experience, from both a technological and sociological vantage point. 
11Computer-based automation is not found in nature. These new machines and 
manufacturing systems are designed by human beings who have certain 
purposes in mind, both technical and social11 (Shaiken, 1986, p. 45). The 
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contradiction, according to Shaiken, is that increases in ''technical productivity" 
often result in decreased socicl,I productivity. The social impacts of these 
technologies include (a) a degradation of work and self, (b) a quantifiable loss 
in other areas of productivity, for example, maintenance, (c) a loss of individual 
knowledge and skills and, (d) the loss of human creative potential (Shaiken, 
1986, p. 5). 
Developing automation in this direction [i.e., the elimination of 
human inputs] carries with it some long-term costs for society. In fact, 
there is a fundamental contradiction between the potential of 
computerization to enrich working life and increase productivity and the 
development of the technology in the pursuit of authoritarian social 
goals. The moral cost is that people's lives become diminished through 
the degrading their work. The productivity loss stems from the inability 
of systems that reduce the input of workers to fully utilize the skill, talent, 
experience, and creativity that only human beings can provide. 
Moreover, in seeking to bypass human input at almost any price, new 
systems often achieve a breathtaking complexity that is prone to 
breakdown and consequently requires even greater human input [e.g. 
installation, maintenance, upgrades]. (Shaiken, 1986, p. 5) 
What Shaiken feared most is a society in which knowledge and practice 
are politically and economically separated. In fact, he pointed out the inevitable 
dangers of artificially separating social, scientific, and technological knowledge 
and action. 
Could human intelligence have arisen independently of the 
practical needs it served? The answer is undoubtedly no. Could 
modern science have developed in a society where craftsmanship and 
manual work were regarded as unbefitting to the thinker? Again the 
answer must be no: a Greek philosopher could in principle have carried 
on experimental science through the agency of a slave; but those 
questions which could be answered only with a slave's assistance would 
have appeared unworthy of the philosopher's attention. So if, in an 
industrial society, intellectual and manual work come to be finally and 
completely divorced, there must be a doubt whether this will not destroy 
the basis on which science and industrial development have themselves 
been able to flourish. There can, at a more personal level, be no doubt 
at all that to deny the experience of interaction between theory and 
practice is damaging to the individual. (Shaiken, 1986, pp. 223-224) 
Shaiken1s substa_ntive work involved description of changes on the 
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machine shop floor, particularly robotics, NC machining, CAM, and the shift of 
decision making, 11skill," and control from the skilled machinist to technocrats 
such as engineers and managers. His response was to propose a more 
democratic workplace and an elimination of the stratification of knowledge, 
skills, and decision making within the socio-technical enterprise. 
The process of technological change does not take place in a 
vacuum. Without a more democratic control of the enterprise as a 
whole, the social control of technology will remain an illusion .... 
Ultimately, the issues transcend collective bargaining and their political 
character becomes apparent. At stake is a more democratic structure 
of economic as well as political decision-making. (Shaiken, 1986, p. 
277) 
The antecedent to a more democratic political and economic 
participation is a more democratic distribution of knowledge and opportunity. 
According to Shaiken, technology as it is applied today tends to remove 
knowledge and opportunity from the worker and inevitably reduces the quality 
of work life. The question remains as to how one brings about such a change. 
One essential force is a revitalized labor movement willing and able to 
take on these larger challenges. While the risks are significant, labor is 
unlikely to hold on to its traditional gains unless they are taken. But the 
issues raised by this technological transformation [i.e., the elimination of 
direct human inputs] affect more than labor: They are issues of central 
concern to the entire society. When work is electronically demeaned in 
the office or the factory, the repercussions carry far beyond the 
workplace. Work remains a central part of life; diminishing the human 
contribution on the job diminishes the quality of life off the job. And, a 
more authoritarian workplace could have a corrosive effect on 
democratic values throughout society. Whether we like it or not, the 
design of machines reflects social values as well as technical needs. 
The ideas and experience of those who are affected by new designs can 
help ensure that computerization will be a force that aids in liberating 
people rather than a vehicle for increased authority and control. 
(Shaiken, 1986, pp. 277-278) 
69 
Shaiken concludes with a Technology Bill of Rights. His approach was 
based on six assumptions (Shaiken, 1986, pp. 271-272). 
1 . A community has to produce in order to live. As a result, it is 
the obligation of an economy to organize people to work. 
· 2. The well-being of people and their communities must be given 
the highest priority in determining the way in which production is carried 
out. 
3. Basing technological and production decisions on narrow 
economic grounds of [short-range] profitability has made working 
people and communities the victims rather than the beneficiaries of 
change. 
4. Given the widespread scope and rapid rate of introduction of 
new technologies, society requires a democratically determined 
institutional, rather than individual, response to changes taking place. 
Otherwise, the social cost of technological change will be borne by those 
least able to pay it: Unemployed workers and shattered communities. 
5. Those that work have a right to participate in the decisions that 
govern their work and shape their lives. 
6. The new automation technologies and the sciences that 
underlie them are the product of a worldwide, centuries-long 
accumulation of knowledge. Accordingly, working people and their 
communities have a right to share in the decisions about, and the gains 
from, new technology. 
Shaiken's proposal involves a unity of social, scientific, and technological 
means and ends. He acknowledged that technology is historically, first and 
foremost, a body of knowledge. People act upon that knowledge which results 
in various technical and social consequences. Often these consequences are 
negative, individually, and/or socially. Shaiken suggested this is due to the fact 
that some people monopolize control over some technological means and 
ends which often adversely affect others who lack those controls. Shaiken 
asserted that such a situation is not only undemocratic, but potentially tragic. 
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The choice should not be new technology or no technology but 
.the development of technology with social responsibility. Therefore, the 
precondition for technological change must be the compliance with a 
program that defines and insures the well being of working people and 
the community. (Shaiken, 1986, p. 272) 
Such a guarantee, according to Shaiken, involves three things (Shaiken, 1986, 
pp. 272-273). 
1. New technology must be used iri a way that creates or 
maintains jobs. 
2. New technology must be used to improve the conditions of 
work. 
3. New technology must be used to develop the industrial base 
and improve the environment. 
Shaiken offered a very substantive analysis of the relationship between 
technological and sociological means and ends. It was not his intention to 
detail the actual reification process by which people come to separate these 
bodies of knowledge and their respective processes and products. He did 
point out, however, that to do so inevitably results in the experience of 
alienation and a reduction in the quality of life of individuals and other social 
groups. More importantly, Shaiken offered the insight that technology can and 
should be a vehicle for the liberation of people. Other writers have also 
focused on the potentially constraining and oppressive effects of computer 
technologies. One such author is Barbara Garson. 
Deskilling and the Degradation of Work: Barbara Garson 
Barbara Garson may be best known as a journalist, playwright, and 
author. However, her extensive use of ethnographic research methods and 
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concern with the social aspects of work warrants the inclusion of her findings in 
this thesis. Her book The Electronic Sweatshop (1988) empirically addressed 
cases in which technology was used as a specific means of controlling work 
and workers, with the result being that the quality and meaning of work was 
diminished. Her thesis is clear: 
Right now a combination of twentieth-century technology and 
nineteenth-century management is turning the Office of the Future into 
the factory of the past. At first this affected clerks and switchboard 
operators, then secretaries, bank tellers and service workers. The 
primary targets now are professionals and managers .... [The] effect is 
to centralize control and make decision making higher up in the 
organization. (Garson, 1988, pp. 10-11) 
This was the goal that guided nineteenth-century industrial 
management. The same principles that transformed craftsmen into 
factory hands are now being applied to make white-collar workers 
cheaper to train, easier to replace, less skilled, less expensive and less 
special. (Garson, 1988, pp. 10-11) 
Garson treated technology as an aspect of the work process. However, 
her thesis suggested that the important factor which influences this process is 
the technical knowledge behind the design of the work itself. 
I started this research with definite ideas about the industrialization of 
office work. I was continually surprised, however, at how much further 
the process had gone than l1d imagined. Extraordinary human ingenuity 
has been used to eliminate the need for human ingenuity. I can1t help 
but convey admiration for the automaters when I describe the machines 
and systems they've developed. 
I was also repeatedly surprised by the wit and acumen of the 
people being automated. Of course human intelligence is something I 
expected to [find]. 
The one thing I didn1t anticipate was the underlying motive. I had 
assumed that employers automate in order to cut costs. And indeed, 
cost cutting is often the result. But I discovered in the course of this 
research that neither the designers nor the users of the highly 
centralized technology I was seeing knew much about its costs and 
benefits, its bottom-line efficiency. The specific form that automation is 
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taking seems to be based less on a rational desire for profit than on an 
irrational prejudice against people. (Garson, 1988, pp. 12-13) 
Garson expressed this argument in Weberian terms. The technology of 
the modern office, according to Garson, is one of bureaucratic means-ends 
calculations. However, the means are legitimized in terms of efficiency and 
profit, whereas the ends are experienced as control and the degradation of 
work. Garson called this techno-bureaucratic trend the 11second industrial 
revolution 11 (1988, p. 11 ). It is characterized by technologies and workplace 
designs that maximize controls over work and workers, at the expense of 
human input, responsiveness, and flexibility. One result, according to Garson, 
is that 11service11 jobs can no longer provide service. An example of this 
phenomena is the McDonald's corporation. 
By combining twentieth-century computer technology with 
nineteenth-century time-and-motion studies, the McDonald's corporation 
has broken the jobs of griddleman, waitress, cashier and even store 
manager down into small, simple steps. Historically these have been 
service jobs involving a lot of flexibility and personal flair. But the 
corporation has systematically extracted the decision-making elements 
from .filling trench fry boxes or scheduling staff. They've siphoned the 
know-how [i.e. technical knowledge] from the employees into the 
programs. They relentlessly weed out all variables that might make it 
necessary to make a decision at the store level, whether on pickles or on 
cleaning procedures. (Garson, 1988, p. 37} 
This control over the work process was achieved through rational technical 
designs including computerized fry vats, bell timers, work scheduling by 
national normative standards, and even cash registers without numbers so 
clerks could not make mathematical entry mistakes. Like Shaiken, Garson 
pointed to a larger trend of deskilling and the removal of decision making from 
the shop floor to the bureaucratic organization. McDonald's store managers 
were turned into 11operators11 in much the same way skilled craftsmen were 
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transformed into operators through the use of numerical controls and computer 
technologies. Garson interviewed a McDonald's store operator: 
11Jon, 11 I said. "This has been fantastic. You are fantastic. I don't 
think anyone could explain the computers to me the way you do. But I 
want to talk to someone who's happy and moving up in the McDonald's 
system. Do you think you could introduce me to a manager who . 11 
"You won't be able to. 11 
11Howcome?11 
"First of all, there's the media hotline. If any press comes around 
or anyone is writing a book I'm supposed to call the regional office 
immediately and they will provide someone to talk to you. So you can't 
speak to a real corporation person except by arrangement with the 
corporation. 
[Second], you can't talk to a happy McDonald's manager 
because 98 percent are miserable. 
[Third of all], there is no such thing as a McDonald's manager. 
The computer manages the store. 11 (Garson, 1988, pp. 38-39) 
The net effect is that you have computers managing people instead of 
the other way around. Garson pursued and confirmed her thesis through the 
examination of several occupations and individual workers. Computers, 
according to Garson, were irrefutably removing human knowledge, decision 
making, and· controls from work and workers and subsequently locating them 
in the technical process and minds of the bureaucratic corporate 
representatives. What is even more problematic, according to Garson, is the 
fact that this type of technology can be self-regulating and self-correcting. The 
issue of covert monitoring of work and workers also threaded through Garson's 
studies. The computers could not only direct the work, but log all deviations 
from standard operating procedures. Such was the case with ticket agents in 
the airline industry, social workers in the human services arena, and even stock 
brokers on Wall Street. All expressed a general degradation of their jobs as 
computers were introduced into the respective industries. All expressed 
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frustration with the inflexibility of the automated systems and the lack of human 
inputs and controls. All related their fears and frustrations concerning the 
covert monitoring and statistical evaluations of their performance-performance 
over which they felt they had little or no individual control. 
At the heart of Garson's thesis is human knowledge-the bureaucrat's 
and technocrat's distrust of it. "The underlying premise of modern automation 
is a profound distrust of the thinking of human beings. More than any 
particular technology, this unanalyzed prejudice against people determines the 
way work is organized" (Garson, 1988, p. 261 ). However, the removal of this 
knowledge from human experience only exacerbates the problem; mindless 
jobs produce mindless people with limited individual and social expectations. 
"Its a vicious circle, eventually producing a labor force fit [only] for McDonald's" 
(Garson, 1988, p. 40). 
Eventually, the stratification and control of the knowledge becomes 
justified, i.e., legitimized, in the psyche of the workers and owners. Garson 
hinted at how this operates and becomes reified in the larger social dialectic. 
Computers may be used in many ways. Like the sewing 
machine, the computer is just a tool. A sewing machine can be used by 
one person to make an entire dress. It can also be used in a sweatshop 
to sew zippers or right cuffs so fast and such small, repetitious motions 
that the result is eye strain, neck ache and damage to the wrists. 
During the first industrial revolution, manual workers like weavers, 
iron molders, and sewing machine operators were systematically de-
skilled, separated from decision making and frequently displaced or 
discarded. It was a horrible hundred years, justified in the name of 
progress. In the place of "progress" a similar abstraction [i.e., 
reification], "the economy," is used today to justify sacrifices made by 
working people. Through a peculiar inverse anthropomorphism, "the 
economy" can somehow be doing well while the majority of people are 
doing poorly. (Garson, 1988, p. 262) 
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Garson pointed to gaps in the social dialectic. Those gaps were created 
and maintained through the separation of knowledge and decision making from 
human action. The result, again, was the experience of alienation by workers 
and the eventual degradation and stratification of the workforce as a whole. 
Garson ends on a Marxian note. 
Hierarchical automation is arranged on the assumption that most 
people are lazy, stupid or hostile. All over the world, technology is 
controlled undemocratically by people who scorn, fear or simply want to 
use their fellow human beings. 
But it seems clear to me that people want and need to work. The 
joy we feel in planning and carrying out a task is probably biological 
[note the similarity here with Marx's concept of species being]. Any 
system that expends so much money and energy on limiting instead of 
using human creativity has got to be inefficient. Yet the individuals now 
making basic decisions about white-collar automation assume that the 
best way to run things is to further centralize control-with themselves in 
command. (Garson, 1988, pp. 262-263) 
It is important to note that such decision making capabilities concerning 
automation are a result of the stratification of technical knowledge-know-how. 
It also reflects the. undemocratic nature of such stratification. It is accompanied 
by the real possibility that human skills, knowledge, and abilities may become 
vestigial, and the technocracies envisioned by Saint-Simon and Bell may be 
close at hand. Like Blauner, Edwards, and Shaiken, Garson insisted that 
workers must regain control over the knowledge and process of their work. 
There are many ways to combine the efficiency of computers with the 
skills and talents of human beings. Frankly, though, I doubt that our 
workplaces will change simply because we start dropping pro-people 
ideas into the suggestion box. The pull in the other direction is very 
powerful. Still, if we insist forcefully enough, perhaps it's not too late to 
say, 11We want the computer but not the sweatshop:' (Garson, 1988, p. 
263) 
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Even though Garson1s primary focus was on popular culture, she still 
addressed the functions and implications of technology in the larger social 
dialectic. However, like many other writers from an ethnographic 11sociology of 
work11 approach (e.g., Blauner, Shaiken, etc.), she failed to extend the argument 
to human experience outside of the workplace. There are a few good 
examples of popular writers who have tried to extend the social impacts of 
technology into everyday life and the larger sociocultural realm. One such 
writer is O.B. Hardison, Jr. 
On Technology, Culture, and Knowing: 0. B. Hardison, Jr. 
When compared with the ethnographic substance of Garson, or Blauner, 
for example, Hardison's work seems exceedingly esoteric. At the same time, it 
typifies the problem Hardison described: Technology is a product of human 
knowledge and at the same time shapes human knowledge. In intersubjective 
terms, technology can and does alter the very meaning structures by which we 
interpret and impose order on the world. In addition, new technologies may 
impose experiences on us which we have neither the language to interpret nor 
the reference frame by which to understand those experiences. Hardison's 
own analytical frame of reference has been influenced heavily by the science of 
chaos (see Gleick, 1987). Hardison appeared to say that human culture 
represents a continuing history of human constructions and impositions of 
order on random patterns in nature. Kant's dilemma concerning the origins of 
knowledge and limits of knowing also haunted Hardison. 
Today, nature has slipped, perhaps finally, beyond our field of vision. 
We can imitate it in mathematics-we can even produce convincing 
images of it-but we can never know it. We can only know our 
creations. (Hardison, 1989, p. 1) 
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Our creations and the experience of them was the main focus of 
Hardison's work. He identified five areas which technology has changed our 
fundamental cultural references: (a) ideas about nature, (b) our understanding 
of history, (c) language itself, (d) art, and finally, (e) our understanding of 
human evolution. Technology has extended the realm of experience outside of 
the human ability to know, understand, and express. Examples of this 
phenomena include the study of sub-atomic particles, deep space, the fossil 
record, etc. 
The framing assumption Hardison based his work on is a realization that 
the largest part of what we believe to be 11objective11 reality is in fact subject to 
the human objectivation process. This realization, though debated for 
centuries in philosophical and scientific circles, was only verified after computer 
programs were written which simulated the 11unfolding 11 of natural phenomena. 
What was found in these simulations is the fact that natural phenomena are 
decidedly random in occurrence. However, in this randomness, patterns can 
be discerned. What we cannot know, can never know, is the real nature of this 
phenomena, i.e., to what extent the patterns are contingent upon the human 
desire to impose such order on a fundamentally random world. The dilemma is 
exacerbated if the line of thought is pursued. If people do in fact impose the 
concept of order on random natural phenomena, what might be the alternative? 
Wouldn't it also be true that disorder would be a human imposition on nature? 
Indeed, computer technology allows people to simulate nature. It still cannot 
provide the framework of understanding needed to arrive at any more 
substantive conclusions about the nature of reality. In fact, it invariably moves 
empirical observation outside of the realm of the senses and back into forces 
unseen and exceedingly mystical. 
Having put this fundamental query aside, Hardison then asserted that 
technology is making nature itself "invisible." It challenges the historical 
categories and patterns we have constructed to interpret, understand, and 
express the "rear• world. 
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In its fearless exploration of inner and outer worlds, modern 
culture has evidently reached a turning point-a kind of phase transition 
from one set of values to another. Crossing the barrier that separates 
the phases is another kind of disappearance. 
The nature of that barrier is nicely characterized in a phrase 
developed by science in connection with the search for extraterrestrial 
life: 1Horizon of invisibility." 
A horizon of invisibility cuts across the geography of modern 
culture. Those who have passed through it cannot put their experiences 
into familiar words and images because the languages they have 
inherited are inadequate to the new worlds they inhabit today. They 
therefore express themselves in metaphors, paradoxes, contradictions, 
· and abstractions rather than languages that 11mean11 in a traditional way-
in assertions that are apparently incoherent or collages using fragments 
of the old to create enigmatic symbols of the new. (Hardison, 1989, p. 
5) 
The human capacity to understand and interpret is invariably dependent 
on language and symbols. Hardison proposed that modern technologies have 
extended the scope of human experience beyond the human capacity to 
express and understand them. 
The most obvious case in point is modern physics, which confronts so 
many paradoxes that physicists like Paul Dirac and Werner Heisenberg 
have concluded that traditional languages are, for better or worse, 
simply unable to represent the world that science has forced on them. 
(Hardison, 1989, p. 6) 
However, the question remains as to whether Hardison sees science as 
an imposition on culture, or, instead, whether culture ultimately imposes 
science on the rest of the world. Nevertheless, given that people have now 
proven that random patterns {or patterned randomness) is the real state of 
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nature, the problem becomes constructing patterns of thinking and acting (i.e., 
culture) which are in harmony with such a nature. This problem has historically 
been addressed by the imposition of references, assurances, and verities on 
the material world such as science, history, language, etc. These, according to 
Hardison, are 11necessary fictions. 11 
The mind cannot get along with them, but it cannot get along without 
them either. They organize experience just as religion, mythology, and 
tradition organize it. They are the preconditions of knowledge .... 
[The] world is a fiction, but perhaps we will eventually discover that the 
fiction makes sense. (Hardison, 1989, p. 47) 
Hardison asserted that science and culture are becoming more and 
more abstract as a result of technologies that access the invisible and 
inexplicable random patterns of nature. Proportionally, our need to understand 
and construct appropriate cultural artifacts and references increases. 
Quantum theory shows that nature cannot be separated from the 
person observing it. Quark theory suggests the existence of entities that 
can never be observed. By proposing that everything in the universe 
comes from nothing, the inflationary theory makes the disappearance of 
nature official. (Hardison, 1989, p. 56) 
To many people, the world of quarks and black holes is an 
affront. Humanity seems to have leaked out of it. To others it is a 
playful world-a world of games and necessary fictions, although some 
of the fictions are more necessary than others. The choice of fictions 
may be decided by the throw of a die, but perhaps not. The question is 
probably being asked in terms of a past that no longer exists rather than 
a present that may not exist but is as good a bet as any when you're 
playing against the house. (Hardison, 1989, p. 57) 
The point Hardison made is that technology inevitably shapes, reshapes, and is 
shaped by these necessary fictions which, taken collectively, are called culture. 
Technology has resulted in the experience of an unseen reality of subatomic 
particles like quarks, muons, gluons, and anti-quarks. On the other end of the 
reality spectrum, people have been subjected to black holes, warped space, 
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and the birth of the universe as accurately as to within 1 Q-43 second. Such 
things negate the historical scientific conceptions of reality-that reality is hard, 
impenetrable, measurable, massive and, above all, empirically observable 
(Hardison, 1989, p. 58). Ironically, while science becomes more and more to 
resemble a human abstraction, art, through technology, takes on ever-more 
11natural 11 forms. Witness fractal geometry and computerized art. Contrary to 
Bacon and the crass positivists, Mandelbroit 11is not out to reproduce nature but 
to make convincing models of it" (Hardison, 1989, p. 60). The result is a 
wedding of technology, science, mathematics, and aesthetic culture. 
Technology, as suggested by Hardison, has turned science and nature on their 
heads. Science and nature are limited human constructions while art, 
particularly in its computerized self-generating forms, can truly represent 
11nature11 in a pristine state. 
The science of the late 20th century asks man to understand 
himself in light of his own reason detached by his history, geography, 
nature, and also from myth, religion, tradition, the idols of the tribe, and 
the dogmas of the fathers. It offers likenesses of nature, not nature, and 
suggests further that nature is a project created in part by man. Culture 
is an artifact and probably a game, and what happens in it is the result of 
human rather than divine will. 
Objectifying this understanding of things requires new languages 
[i.e., significations; see Berger & Luckmann, 1967, for an extended 
discussion]. (Hardison, 1989, pp. 70-71) 
If science is a human creation, we have caught the mind in the 
very act of swallowing up the world, which is another way of saying that 
we have witnessed nature in the process of disappearing. The steps are 
neatly defined by the figures of Charles Darwin [progressive evolution], 
D'Arcy Thompson [geometric forms and shapes], and Benoit 
Mandelbroit [fractal geometry]. They take us from a nature that is alien 
and into which human motives are poured, to a nature that is number-
but number authenticated by an absolute order-to an imitation of nature 
by means of a number that is also a form of art. (Hardison, 1989, p. 71) 
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A fundamentally different understanding and experience of science-a 
fundamentally different nature-derives from the modern technological 
objectivation of knowledge. Accordingly, a different perspective on the world is 
called for. Hardison pointed out that as the scope of scientific knowledge and 
experience increased, the homogeneity of culture and cultural artifacts also 
increased. The result, according to Hardison, is the disappearance of 
progress and history. 
Science is committed to the universal. . . . [As] the corollary of 
science [sic], technology also exhibits the universalizing tendency. This 
is why the spread of technology makes the world look ever more 
homogeneous. Architectural styles, dress styles, musical styles-even 
eating styles-tend increasingly to be world styles. The world looks 
more homogeneous because it is more homogeneous. Children who 
grow up in this world therefore experience it as a sameness rather than a 
diversity, and because their identities are shaped by this sameness, their 
sense of differences among cultures and individuals diminishes. As 
buildings become more alike, the people who inhabit the buildings 
· become more alike. The result is described precisely in a phrase that is 
already familiar: the disappearance of history. (Hardison, 1989, pp. 
142-143) 
Indeed, Hardison saw technology at the core of a long-term trend toward 
cultural homogeneity. However, such a trend must be accompanied by the 
ability of individuals to know, understand, and express themselves in 
meaningful and culturally relevant ways. 
Cultural evolution should not be understood, any more than 
biological evolution, in terms of movement from bad to good or good to 
better. Its absolute direction is best symbolized by an arrow pointing 
down a dark corridor. 
There is, however, a unifying theme. Every advance in culture 
has been an advance in communications and has encouraged ever-
larger organizations of the human beings who produced it. . . . The 
movement has its downs and ups but the direction is continuous .... 
With every day that passes it becomes a little more impossible for us to 
act or think otherwise than collectively. (Hardison, 1989, p. 288) 
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Even so, a collective identity can come no closer to a more 
comprehensive understanding of science, technology, and culture than an 
individual can. The possibility always remains that all the birds are flying in the 
wrong direction. The risk, according to Hardison, is that we may lose sight of 
what it means to be human. With artificial intelligence, expert systems, self-
generating art, science, and material culture, a growing gap is created between 
rational action, human experience, and knowledge itself. 
People have tried to create machines in their own image, only to find that 
the act itself inevitably alters the human image, making necessary a 
reassessment of meaning. Thus, a potential gap in the social dialectic is 
constructed. To exacerbate the problem, technological products have been 
given the power to create and manipulate new information apparently 
independent of their human counterparts. Hardison suggested that technology 
has brought us closer to an intersubjective understanding of reality, but at the 
same time brought into question what it really means to be human. 
In the preceding pages, we have reviewed the disappearance of 
fundamental verities in several of the major areas of modern culture: 
science, history, language, art. Consideration of intelligent machines 
suggests that the idea of humanity is changing so rapidly that it, too, can 
legitimately and without and exaggeration be said to be disappearing. 
(Hardison, 1989, p. 347) 
These changes have been made possible by new technologies which 
have extended the realm of the senses, even beyond traditional empirical 
possibilities. As people create and recreate their material world through the 
objectivation of technological knowledge, culture and other ideas must also be 
recreated which complement new contexts of experience. Hardison suggested 
that many of our traditional notions about science, art, nature, history, 
language, and human evolution have been inevitably transformed in the 
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process. Transformed, possibly, past the point of our ability to create 
appropriate symbols of understanding, even to the point of total transparency, 
i.e., invisibility. 
Hardison offered a profound and fascinating treatise on how new 
technologies have changed the way we express ourselves through language 
and in the arts, as well as how we understand the world by creating sciences, 
nature, and historical records. The analysis lacks substance. However, it is a 
representative example of modern literary attempts to better understand the 
relationship of science, technology, and society. One other example from 
current contemporary literature will be examined: Richard Saul Wurman's 
discussion of Information Anxiety. 
Wurman and the Impacts of Information Technology 
Richard Saul Wurman was concerned with how the exponential growth 
of information affects individuals. Wurman proposed that the recent 
information explosion creates anxiety in many people. This is due to the fact 
that people feel a·compelling need to understand their experiences and derive 
meaning and knowledge directly from their immediate environment. However, 
according to Wurman, people are now exposed to more information than they 
can process and understand. The result, as coined by Wurman, is information 
anxiety. 
Information anxiety is produced by the ever-widening gap 
between what we understand and what we think we should understand. 
· information anxiety is the black hole between data and knowledge. It 
happens when information doesn't tell us what we need to know. 
(Wurman, 1989, p. 34) 
Almost everyone suffers from information anxiety to some degree. 
We read without comprehending, see without perceiving, hear without 
listening. It can be experienced as moments of frustration with a manual 
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that refuses to divulge the secret to operating a video recorder or a map 
that bears no relation to reality. It can happen at a cocktail party when 
someone mentions the name Allan Bloom and the only person you know 
. by that name is your dentist. It can also be manifested as a chronic 
malaise, a pervasive fear that we are about to be overwhelmed by the 
very material we need to master in order to function in this world. 
(Wurman, 1989, p. 34) 
Wurman suggested that the term 11information explosion 11 is a misnomer. 
What we really have, according to Wurman, is a 11non-information explosion 111 
(Wurman, 1989, p. 38). Information can only 11inform 11 if it conveys meaning. 
Meaning is a prerequisite to the accumulation of knowledge. The information 
(or non-information) explosion is really a data explosion. People have the 
technical capabilities to churn out endless streams of data in absence of any 
meaning or interpretation whatsoever. One of the defining characteristics of 
homo sapiens is a capacity for knowledge, i.e., knowing. The success of the 
species itself is often attributed to the accumulation and dissemination of 
knowledge. Wurman's thesis was that the sheer volume of information or data 
available creates anxiety resulting from the insatiable human 11need to know11 
and parallel need to construct and express meaning. 
Information anxiety can afflict us at any level and is as likely to result from 
too much as too little information. 
There are several situations likely to induce information anxiety: 
not understanding information; feeling overwhelmed by the amount of 
information to be understood; not knowing if certain information exists; 
not knowing where to find information; and, perhaps the most 
frustrating, knowing exactly where to find the information, but not having 
the key to access it. (Wurman, 1989, p. 44) 
The information overload concept is not new. Alvin Toffler discussed the 
implications in the book Future Shock (1970). In terms of the psychological 
dimensions of the impacts of information technology, Toffler may have best 
outlined the process. 
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Rational behavior, in particular, depends upon a ceaseless flow of data 
from the environment. It depends upon the power of the individual to 
predict, with at least fair success, the outcome of his own actions. To do 
this, he must be able to predict how the environment will respond to his 
acts. Sanity, itself, thus hinges on man's ability to predict his immediate, 
personal future on the basis of information fed him by the environment. 
When the individual is plunged into a fast and irregularly changing 
situation, or a novelty-loaded context, his predictive accuracy plummets. 
He can no longer make the reasonably correct assessments on which 
rational behavior is dependent. 
To compensate for this, to bring accuracy up to the normal level 
again, he must scoop up and process far more information than before. 
And he must do this at extremely high rates of speed. In short, the more 
rapidly changing and novel the environment, the more information the 
individual needs to process in order to make effective, rational decisions. 
(Toffler, 1970, pp. 350-351) 
Nearly two decades after Toffler, Wurman proposed that the nature of 
information now requires more than just the ability to 11scoop up and process 
more. 11 Overcoming information anxiety, according to Wurman, requires a 
different type of knowledge-the knowledge of information dissemination-the 
ability to identify pertinent information, disregard non-pertinent information, and 
finally, transform it into meaningful knowledge. 
The old formulas and systems of data processing are impotent 
against the complexity of information we must assimilate today. We 
need to develop new formulas for understanding. We need to treat 
understanding as a business in itself, not only as a component of all 
other business. (Wurman, 1989, p. 52) 
To comprehend new information of any kind-be it financial 
reports, appliance manuals, or a new recipe-you must go through 
certain processes and meet certain conditions before understanding can 
take place. You must have some interest in receiving the information; 
you must uncover the structure or framework by which it is or should be 
organized; you must relate the information to ideas that you already 
understand; and you must test the information against those ideas and 
examine it from different vantage points in order to 11possess11 or know it. 
(Wurman, 1989, p. 53) 
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Wurman expanded on all these concepts and offered a 11cookbook11 approach 
to overcoming information anxiety. The brilliance of Wurman•s work is not in 
the conceptualization but in the operationalization of the ideas. He constructed 
several psychological indicators which allow for testing and measurement of 
the variable 11information anxiety. 11 These indicators (Wurman, 1989, pp. 35-36) 
include: 
1. Chronically talking about not keeping up with what•s going on 
around you. 
2. Feeling guilty about that ever higher stack of periodicals 
waiting to be read. 
3. Nodding your head knowingly when someone mentions a 
book, an artist, or a news story that you have never heard of before. 
4. Finding that you are unable to explain something that you 
thought you understood. 
5. Blaming yourself for not being able to follow the instructions 
for putting a bike [or anything else] together. 
6. Refusing to buy a new appliance or piece of equipment 
because you are afraid you won1t be able to operate it. 
7. Feeling depressed because you don•t know what all the 
buttons are for on your VCR. 
8. Buying hi-tech electronics because you feel that through 
osmosis you1II become more technologically knowledgeable. 
9. Calling The Society of Mind 11prophetic11 even though you 
couldn1t even understand the book review, which is all you read. 
10. Looking down at your digital watch to sign in the exact time 
in an office building logbook even though you know no one really cares. 
11. Giving time and attention to news that has no cultural, 
economic, or scientific impact on your life. 
12. Filling out a form and feeling compelled to fill in each and 
every blank. 
13. Reacting emotionally to information you don't understand-
like not knowing what the Dow Jones really is, but panicking when you 
hear that it has dropped 500 points. 
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14. Thinking that the person next to you understands everything 
that you don't. 
15. Being to afraid or too embarrassed to say 111 don't know. 11 
16. Or worse, calling something information that you don't 
understand 
Though some of these indicators may appear humorous, they all 
adequately depict the psychological dilemma information technology-and 
technology in general-places individuals in. This dilemma is characterized by 
a need to know, explain, and express one's own everyday experiences. It is 
also a technological crisis in at least one respect: Technology is first and 
foremost a form of knowledge. 
There is indeed a knowledge crisis. The recurring theme in Wurman, 
Tattler, and other contemporary writers on the impacts of technological change 
is that there exists a gap between rational action, human experience, and 
human knowledge and understanding. For whatever reason-the stratification 
of knowledge (power and control issues); an institutional separation of 
scientific, social, and technological knowledge, means, and ends; or even 
individual lack of understanding-there is a growing gap between human 
objectivations, experience, and an understanding of the social-dialectical 
process and its consequences. It takes different names and forms, e.g. 
reification, technocratic thinking, alienation, future shock, information anxiety, 
technophobia. What is needed is a more comprehensive analytical framework 
within which to better understand the place and process of each of these 
similar, yet still different, phenomena. The most comprehensive and 
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enlightening attempt yet, though still focused primarily in the sociology of work, 
is Harvard Business Professor Shoshana Zuboff's study and review, titled In the 
Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and Power . 
Zuboff, Technological Knowledge, and a Social Dialectic 
Shoshana Zuboff synthesized many of the important findings from the 
literature on technological and social change. The result was a comprehensive 
analysis of the social and psychological impacts of technology based on an 
empirical ethnographic_study of several workers and workplaces. Having 
demonstrated a remarkable command of the existing literature, she expressed 
a dissatisfaction with the limited scope and depth of those previous analyses: 
Through this [review of the literature], I tried to grasp how everyday life 
had been altered by the profound material change in those means and 
methods of production. . . . In many cases it provided rich detail about 
behavior, or the interpretation of behavior by human observers, but 
offered inadequate insight into the subtleties of human experience. 
(Zuboff, 1988, p. xi) 
Zuboff began her treatise with the assumption that any measurement 
and assessment of human experience must also involve the process of how 
people construct their own realities. She explained, "As my work progressed, I 
was ever more fascinated with the very different social constructions of reality 
that characterized workers then and now11 (Zuboff, 1988, p. xi). She was aware 
that human action and experience is ulimately interwined with human 
knowledge and corresponding assumptions about reality. Zuboff's thesis was 
that once objective experience (which she refers to as sentience) becomes 
separated from knowledge and understanding, distress, alienation, and 
confusion invariably arise (Zuboff, 1988, p. xii). 
Zuboff tended to treat the advent of information-based social relations as 
a major historical transformation. 
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I realized that the people I had been interviewing were on the edge of a 
historical transformation of immense proportions, as important as that 
which has been experienced by the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
workers about whom I had read so much and imagined even more. 
(Zuboff, 1988, p. xiii) 
She was influenced by Bell's concept of a post-industrial society, but found the 
analysis little more than a "sociological abstraction" (Zuboff, 1988, p. xiv). 
I wanted to discover the flesh and blood behind the concepts, the 
interior texture rather than the external form. I wanted to understand the 
practical problems that would have to be confronted in order to manage 
the new computerized workplace in ways that would fulfill the lofty 
premise of a knowledge-based society and to generate knowledge that 
would be instructive to those charged with managerial responsibility. 
(Zuboff, 1988, p. xiv) 
Zuboff outlined her project and assumptions as such: 
The approach would combine participant observations with semiclinical 
interviews and small group discussions. I intended to use my clinical 
skills to help people articulate their still-implicit experiences in the new 
work settings. With such data it would be possible to identify generic 
patterns of psychological and organizational experience associated with 
the emerging technological conditions of work. . . . [It] seemed likely 
that in the apparently maladaptive responses of workers to computer-
based technology (what many called "resistance to change"), it would be 
possible to trace a lineage of ordinary assumptions that referred back to 
the realities of the past and their points of disjuncture with the future. 
(Zuboff, 1988, p. xiv) 
What Zuboff appeared to be doing was identifying gaps in the social 
dialectic-gaps between existing knowledge and assumptions, rational action, 
and the ability to assimilate ongoing experience with existing social and 
psychological structures. The goal, according to Zuboff, is to derive meaning 
from this experience. The problem is that many information-based 
technologies are designed to remove knowledge and control from individuals 
and locate it in exterior processes and products. The result is alienation and 
the loss of meaning. 
As more tasks must be accomplished through the medium of 
information technology (I call this 11computer-mediated work11), the 
sentient body loses its salience as a source of knowledge, resulting in 
profound disorientation and loss of meaning. (Zuboff, 1988, pp. 5-6) 
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To better understanding the process by which alienation and meaninglessness 
becomes possible, an important distinction must be made between automation 
and information technologies. Like many of the other authors reviewed herein, 
Zuboff identified the sociological importance of the computer's ability to 
generate new information in the absence of any meaning and interpretation. 
What is it, then, that distinguishes information technology from 
earlier generations of machine technology? As information technology 
is used to reproduce, extend, and improve on the process of 
substituting machines for human agency, it simultaneously accomplishes 
something quite different. The devices that automate by translating 
information into action also register data about those automated 
activities, thus generating new streams of information. (Zuboff, 1988, p. 
9) 
Automation- and information-based technologies are not necessarily the 
same thing. Information technology produces additional data outside of direct 
human inputs. The result of this is that people are subject to the experience of 
this data in absence of their own rational action, intention, and understanding. 
This does not, however, inevitably result in a loss of meaning. Zuboff asserted 
that this information can also provide the means for a broader and deeper 
understanding of the social dialectical process. She referred to this capacity as 
11informating. 11 
In its capacity as an automating technology, information 
technology has a vast potential to displace the human presence. Its 
implications as an informating technology, on the other hand, are not 
well understood. The distinction between automate and informate 
provides one way to understand how this technology represents both 
continuities and discontinuities with the traditions of industrial history. As 
long as the technology is treated narrowly in its automating function, it 
perpetrates the logic of the industrial machine that, over the course of 
this century, has made it possible to rationalize work while decreasing 
the dependence on human skills. However, when the technology also 
informates the processes to which it is applied, it increases the explicit 
information context of tasks and sets into motion a series of dynamics 
that will ultimately reconfigure the nature of work and the social 
relationships that organize productive activity. 
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Because this duality of intelligent technology has not been clearly 
recognized, the consequences of the technology's informating capacity 
are often regarded as unintended. Its effects are not planned, and the 
potential that it lays open remains relatively unexploited. Because the 
informating process is poorly defined, it often evades the conventional 
categories of description that are used to gauge the effects of industrial 
technology. (Zuboff, 1988, pp. 10-11) 
This concept of informating is similar to Wurman's concept of information 
anxiety and the process of overcoming it. In order to derive meaning from 
experience, one must have an antecedent frame of reference upon which to 
accommodate and/or assimilate the information. Human choices in terms of 
organizational design can either supply and enhance, or remove and distort, 
this reference frame. Zuboff insightfully suggested that control and 
stratification of this knowledge-based frame of reference provides new power 
and authority structures in modern industries. Not only do managers choose 
whether or not to automate, they also choose whether or not to informate. 
Most importantly, according to Zuboff, informating is the important variable in 
determining the social relations of the modern workplace (1988, p. 11). In 
effect, Zuboff suggested that the informating power of information technology, 
and the stratification of that knowledge, will invariably determine the future of 
work and power in industrial society. 
[It] has been second nature for managers to use technology to delimit 
worker discretion and, in this process, to concentrate knowledge within 
the managerial domain. The special dilemmas raised by information 
technology require managers to reconsider these assumptions. When 
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information and control technology is used to turn the worker into 11just 
another mechanical variable," one immediate result is the withdrawal of 
the worker's commitment and accountability for the work. This lack of 
care requires additional managerial vigilance and leads to a need for 
increased automatic control. As this dynamic unfolds, it no longer 
seems shocking to contemplate an image of work laced with 
stupefaction and passivity, in which the human being is a hapless 
bystander at the margins of productive activity. (Zuboff, 1988, p. 69) 
Zuboff1s fears are reminiscent of those of Harley Shaiken1s-that the 
relative knowledge base of the human species as a whole may be deteriorated 
as the control and stratification of knowledge and meaning are increasingly 
invested in managerial and technical machinery. As Garson pointed out 
{1988), we may be approaching a workforce fit only for McDonalds. Zuboff 
was able to identify individual and social-structural impacts of information 
technology including individual alienation, loss of productivity, and a social 
milieu in which the creative and productive potential of the workforce as a 
whole was diminished. This bridge of the objective and subjective dimensions 
of technology is but one of the strengths of her thesis. 
Having outlined the process by which people become alienated from 
their jobs and selves in modern information-based workplaces, Zuboff 
suggested ways in which workers can be reunited with their work, selves, and 
others. The first step is to recognize the importance and interrelationship of 
skills and knowledge. Traditionally, Zuboff explained, skills were 11action-
centered.11 Zuboff identified four defining characteristics of action-centered 
skills: (a) sentience, or being derived from immediate physical cues, (b) action-
dependence, i.e., contingent upon an objectivation process involving direct 
action, (c) context-dependence, i.e., bound to a specific and immediate frame 
of reference and, (d) personalism, or the interiority of knowledge and 
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understanding. Action-centered skills are tied directly to immediate experience. 
The computer, according to Zuboff, removes the sentience from knowledge. "It 
is as if one's job had vanished into a two-dimensional space of abstractions, 
where digital symbols replace concrete reality" (Zuboff, 1988, p. 63). The 
abstraction process necessitated by computers removed the action context 
from work. 
Yet even as managers argued over the essentiality of action-centered 
skill, technology was irreversibly altering the context in which the 
operators performed. The opportunities to develop such skills were 
becoming increasingly rare as the action context was paved over by the 
data highway. (Zuboff, 1988, p. 67) 
Zuboff's assessment was that, for the majority of those workers she examined, 
the concrete frame of reference needed to understand their jobs and derive 
meaning from their own actions was lost-abstracted into a process, machine, 
and experiential context over which they had little control or understanding. 
This also changed the nature of social interaction itself. 
Another distinction in Zuboff's analysis was how social interaction 
becomes transformed by the computer. The nature of digitized information 
removes it from any human inter-communicative context. People who were 
accustomed to "acting with" now were forced to "act on" information-more 
problematically, acting on abstracted information in absence of concrete 
materials and contexts. Since people are social beings by nature and require a 
consistent flow of social interaction to develop and maintain their identities, the 
isolation from interaction, i.e., the inability to "act with, 11 invariably produced 
discomfort in Zuboff's subjects. 
Automation meant that jobs which once allowed them to use their bodily 
presence in the service of personal exchange and collaboration now 
required their bodily presence in the service of routine interaction with a 
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machine. Jobs that had once required their voices now insisted they be 
mute. Jobs that had been able to utilize at least some small measure of 
their personhood now emphasized their least individually differentiated 
and most starkly animal capabilities. They had been disinherited from 
the management process, and driven into the confines of their individual 
body space. As a result, the employees in each office became 
increasingly engulfed in the immediate sensations of physical discomfort. 
(Zuboff, 1988, p. 141) 
Zuboff contended that this also represented the shift from action-centered 
skills. 
Action-centered skills then are limited to the time frame of events 
and the presence of actors in the context where those events can occur. 
In other words, action-centered skills are a part of oral culture. They 
demand present-tense arrangement in the immediate world of objects 
and people. (Zuboff, 1988, p.175) 
The written word can abstract from the human experience, but orality 
relies upon situational and operational frames of reference that remain 
close to real human activity. (Zuboff, 1988, p.176) 
In a substantive fashion, Zuboff has outlined the actual process by 
which, as a result of a new type of technology, people become alienated from 
their work, themselves, and other people. This process includes the 
stratification of knowledge through managerial and technical machinery, and 
the removal of knowledge and understanding from action and experience. 
Zuboff contended that the trend toward information-based technologies 
is irreversible (1988, p. 67). Consequently, Zuboff proposed that management 
undertake a reskilling process, beginning with an organizational design which 
cultivates intellective skills to replace the action-centered skills and frames of 
reference which previously linked action, experience, and knowledge. More 
significantly, the informating capacity of information technology can be the 
basis for this endeavor. 
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The automating capacity of the technology can free the human being for 
a more comprehensive, explicit, systematic, and abstract knowledge of 
his or her work made possible by the technology's ability to informate. 
(Zuboff, 1988, p. 181) 
This 11informating, 11 according to Zuboff, is contingent upon two things: (a) 
individual competence and, (b) the ability to use and express that competence. 
Both these things are directly related to organizational design and the 
distribution of knowledge and responsibility. 
The way in which the technology is deployed is crucial in 
determining whether intellective skill, once developed, can be utilized. 
There is a need to create organizational environments that support the 
quality of effort and the kinds of relationships in which intellectual 
competence can be demonstrated. (Zuboff, 1988, pp. 183-184) 
Zuboff's strongest argument was that the very nature of information 
technology requires that workers have intellective skills. These skills involve the 
cognitive construction of implicit meanings, contexts, and frames of reference 
(Zuboff, 1988, p. 192). It is a mastery of the symbolic medium as opposed to 
the action medium. Such skills, however, cannot be developed in an 
organizational setting where workers are denied access and control to the very 
information they must manipulate and understand. 
The construction of meaning from the electronic text that now represents 
the production process is likely to require more deliberative, controlled, 
aware, cognitive effort than earlier action-centered context-dependent 
routines. (Zuboff, 1988, p. 191) 
What might this imply for the human being at the data interface? 
Over the long term, intellective mastery will depend on being able to 
develop a tacit knowledge that facilitates the recognition of decision 
alternatives and frees the mind for the kind of insight that could result in 
innovation and improvement. Such tacit recognition depends on first 
being able to explicitly construct the significance of patterns and 
relationships in the data. Such meanings cannot be achieved without a 
level of intellective skill development that allows the worker to solve the 
problem of reference, engage in reasoning that is both inductive and 
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deductive, and apply a conceptual framework to the information at hand. 
Meaning must be constructed explicitly in order to become implicit later. 
Intellective skill is necessary for the creation of meaning, and real 
mastery begins to emerge when such meanings are consolidated in tacit 
knowledge. While the development of mastery in the action medium 
does not require extensive explication, mastery in the symbolic medium 
depends upon explicitly constructed meaning, and intellective skill is the 
means by which this is achieved. While this does not solve the problem 
of attentional commitment, it does imply that attention can be freed for 
increasingly comprehensive tasks, invention, and experimentation as 
intellective skill allows the consolidation of lower-order information in the 
form of tacit knowledge. (Zuboff, 1988, pp. 192-193) 
The final conclusion Zuboff arrived at was a call for a redistribution of 
knowledge within the organization. Such a redistribution inevitably involves a 
redefinition of power and authority, in addition to a restoration of technical 
knowledge and controls to the individual worker. Intellective skills are 
mandated if the productive capacity and motivation of the individual worker is 
to be maximized. 
The organizations described in this book have illustrated how the 
need to defend and reproduce the legitimacy of managerial authority 
can channel potential innovation toward a conventional emphasis on 
automation. In this context, managers emphasize machine intelligence 
and managerial control over the knowledge base at the expense of 
developing knowledge in the operating work force. They use the 
technology as a fail-safe system to increase their sense of certainty and 
control over both production and organizational functions. Their 
experiences suggest that the traditional environment of imperative 
control is fatally flawed in its ability to adequately exploit the informating 
capacity of the new technology. (Zuboff, 1988, p. 390) 
In the absence of a comprehensive strategy, no single organization fully 
succeeded in exploiting the opportunity to informate. 
The interdependence of the three dilemmas of transformation I 
have described-knowledge, authority, and technique-indicates the 
necessary comprehensiveness of an informating strategy. The shifting 
grounds of knowledge invite managers to recognize the emergent 
demands for intellective skills and develop a learning environment in 
which such skills can develop. That very recognition contains a threat to 
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managerial authority, which depends in part on control over the 
· organization1s knowledge base. A commitment to intellective skills 
development is likely to be hampered when an organization1s division of 
labor continuously replenishes the felt necessity of imperative control. 
Managers who must prove and defend their own legitimacy do not easily 
share knowledge or engage in inquiry. Workers who feel the 
requirements of subordination are not enthusiastic learners. (Zuboff, 
1988, p. 391) 
Zuboff concluded that the division of labor should not be a 11division of 
learning. 11 Such a division of learning promotes gaps in the social dialectic-
gaps between the individual and social self, gaps between social classes and 
groups, and gaps between human potential and experiential reality. 
Technology need not be a means which exacerbates this process; it can and 
should be a means to close these gaps and emancipate people from the unjust 
and unresponsive social relations they have created. Of course, this is a 
choice we both individually and collectively must all make. 
Zuboff1s analysis is perhaps the apex of the accessible literature on the 
relationship between technology, science, and society. It successfully 
integrated most of the recurrent themes throughout the literature such as 
alienation, deskilling, power and authority, technical controls, and above all, the 
stratification and reification of technological knowledge. Her analysis was 
grounded in a meticulous review of the literature and backed by empirical 
ethnographic data. In addition to an unsurpassed description of the 
phenomena, she offered suggestions (if not mandates) for the resolution of the 
problems she saw and described. The only criticism to be made of Zuboff is 
one made of other authors herein cited-the impacts of technology are seldom 
limited in scope to the context of work. 
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Although Zuboff1s synthesis of the literature and analytical approach 
remain remarkably solid, a similar attempt to integrate the recurrent issues will 
be made herein. The goal now is to address and integrate the scope and 
depth of the cited literature for the explicit purpose of providing a firm 
theoretical foundation from which to continue empirical research on the topic of 
science, technology, and society. 
FOCUSED INTEGRATION OF THE LITERATURE 
Toward a Working Definition of Technology 
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The accessible literature on the relationship of technology and sociology 
is a conceptual hodgepodge. Prior to the institutionalization of sociology, 
science, and technology as academic disciplines, these concepts made up a 
larger unified body of knowledge and practice. As previously pointed out, 
many of the enlightenment-era innovators simultaneously dabbled in scientific, 
technological, and social reforms (Bronowski & Mazlish, .1960; Collins & 
Makowsky, 1984; McKay, Hill, & Buckler, 1983; Weinstein, 1982). The 
institutionalization and bureaucratization of this previously unified body of 
knowledge into separate disciplines provided the initial impetus for reification to 
occur. Essentially, people began to enthusiastically pursue technological 
innovation outside of associated social and environmental concerns. On a 
macro-objective level of analysis, a separation and stratification of the 
knowledge base was created. The result of this stratification is that some 
individuals are able to monopolize certain forms of knowledge, e.g. technology, 
to influence social outcomes, e.g., economic, environmental, ideological, etc. 
This aspect of technology as a form of knowledge has become a central theme 
in the Critical School of sociology (Ritzer, 1988). Conceptually, technology can 
be best approached as a form and body of knowledge (Weinstein, 1982). 
However, the body of literature on the topic makes no such distinction. The 
concept still begs for operationalization in light of the divergent approaches to 
the subject itself. 
Several of the authors cited deal with technology in terms of technical 
process. Some examples of this general tendency are Weber's concept of 
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"rational technique" and Durkheim1s "division of labor.11 The technological 
variables in Blauner1s study were technical processes, although he claimed 
technology itself also involved the machine system and accompanying 
knowledge-based skills (Blauner, 1964, p. 6). Marx to some extent equated 
technology with a mode of production, but still defined technology as 11know-
how.11 The technical process is one way that the concept of technology has 
historically been operationalized. 
Many of the cited works treat technology as objects and products that 
result from a technical process. Ogburn and Nimkoff (1955) referred to 
impacts of specific technological products on social relationships. Many 
writers (e.g., Blauner, Garson, Hardison, Wurman, Zuboff) spoke of 
technological products such as numerical controls and computers as having 
specific impacts on individuals, yet made no clear distinctions between 
technological knowledge, processes, products, and the experience of them. 
As previously pointed out, it is difficult to address technology without 
discussing its processes and products. Historically, one way to operationalize 
technology has been to examine specific technological products and their 
social effects. 
When technology has been addressed empirically (e.g., Blauner, 
Garson, Shaiken, Zuboff), technology has been operationalized as an 
interpretive experience. The 1947 Roper Survey (reproduced in Blauner, 1964, 
pp. 210-214) asked for individuals to respond to several questions concerning 
their immediate experience with technology at work. Hardison, Wurman, and 
Tattler have operationalized technology in terms of the volume of information 
people are able to meaningfully experience and understand. Since all meaning 
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is derived from experience, the experience of technology must also be an 
important consideration in the operationalization of technology as a concept. 
Finally, several authors have treated technology as a form and body of 
knowledge (e.g., Berger & Luckmann, Braverman, Mannheim, Marcuse, Marx, 
Weinstein). As previously asserted, if one is to empirically address the subject 
of technology, the sociology of knowledge approach is the most useful. This 
assertion is made under the assumption that all reality is an intersubjective 
phenomenon in which knowledge is a unifying foundation. A working definition 
of technology then becomes "Knowledge of how to manipulate the social and 
natural environment." Technology, accordingly, has social-dialectical moments 
involving technical processes, objective products and relations, and human 
interpretive experiences, all requiring measurement and assessment if the 
nature of social reality is to be adequately explained. 
Technology1s Place in the Social Dialectic 
One of the major criticisms of a sociology of knowledge approach is that 
it lacks empirical referents (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1988, p. 237). It is 
asserted herein that the lack of empirical referents in the approach is not a flaw 
of the approach itself, but a failure of individual researchers to adequately 
operationalize the concepts under investigation. 
To empirically study technology as an explanatory variable in an 
intersubjective reality, one must analytically separate the social-dialectical 
moments of the concept. As extrapolated from the review of the literature, 
these moments categorically include technological knowledge itself, technical 
processes, technological products, and human experiences. There also exists 
a macro-social process in which the separation and stratification of 
technological knowledge provides a context in which reification and the 
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fetishism of technology can thrive. The operationalization of the concept of 
technology must include all these moments in the social dialectic if meaningful 
social explanation is to be pursued. 
Call for Empirical Application and Research 
The critical roots of this thesis assert that to improve society is of equal, if 
not greater, importance than explaining society. The strength of the sociology 
of knowledge approach to technology is that it returns the locus of 
technological control to individuals. The literature is rich with descriptions of 
gaps introduced into the social dialectic which are technological in origin. 
These include gaps between understanding and action, intended action and 
objective outcomes, objective outcomes and interpretive experiences, and 
finally, interpretive experience and existing knowledge. By critiquing the 
stratification of knowledge and raising the consciousness of technologically and 
ideologically oppressed and misguided individuals, a more responsive and 
democratic society can ensue. For the researcher, effective critique begins 
with the empirical observation of the existing objective human conditions, 
actions, experiences, and understandings. A call for such research is made 
and a proposal for such research follows. 
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PROPOSAL FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: MEASURING INDICATORS OF 
SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF TECHNOLOGY 
Summary 
Technology can be an important and significant explanatory variable in 
sociological research. A review of the literature on the topic finds that there is a 
relative absence of generalizable empirical data in this area. Recent 
widespread technological changes, e.g., computer technology, 
communications, micro-electronics, information technology, etc. suggest a 
more comprehensive study of these impacts on the everyday lives of people be 
undertaken. This proposal suggests that a random-sample mail survey and 
subsequent data analysis be utilized to assess how, through a reification 
process, specific aspects of technology might negatively affect individual 
perceptions and objective social phenomena. 
The proposal briefly outlines problem areas in the literature. Based on 
an analytical approach which integrates components of Critical theory, the 
sociology of knowledge, and a new dialectical model, technology is then 
reconceptualized and operationalized. Indicators are subsequently developed 
and categorized within this analytical framework. Using these indicators, 
hypotheses are developed and an appropriate research method, i.e., a mail 
survey, is outlined. Finally, suggestions for computer data analyses are made. 
Problem Statement and Brief Review 
A review of the historical treatment of technology in sociological theory 
and research leads the researcher to the identification of several problems. 
The first and most serious is the inconsistency of ways which technology has 
been conceptualized. Many writers (e.g., Blauner, 1964; Edwards, 1979; 
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Weber, 1978/1921) have treated technology primarily as technique. Others 
(e.g., Ogburn & Nimkoff, 1955) have talked of technology as products, 
machines, and materials in the objective sense. Some writers spoke of 
technology as an experience requiring unique interpretations and adaptations 
(e.g., Hardison, 1989; Wurman, 1989). Another approach is to treat technology 
as form of knowledge, or 11know-how11 (e.g., Weinstein, 1982). Others writers 
have not made such distinctions and have combined these categories in 
various ways (e.g., Braverman, 1974; Bell, 1976; Garson, 1988; Zuboff, 1988). 
Critical theorists (e.g., Mannheim, Marcuse) see technology primarily as form of 
knowledge. If the understanding and control of technology is considered as a 
necessary value and goal, the knowledge approach to technology then 
becomes the most useful. This is due to the fact that a knowledge-based 
approach locates the knowledge and control of technology in individuals. For 
the purposes of this proposal, technology will be seen primarily as form of 
knowledge with subsequent dialectical moments, i.e., technical processes, 
objectivated products, in addition to human experiences and interpretations 
(see Figure 1 for an illustration and review of the theoretical model). The 
proposed research will test the utility and integrity of the model by separating 
the moments of the social dialectic into different categories of indicators. Such 
an analytical model is prerequisite to the construction of a statistical multiple 
regression model which adequately explains the social and psychological 
impacts of technology. This is necessary if one desires to explain where gaps 
in the social dialectic actually occur. The problem of past attempts to 
conceptualize technology is that, without clearly distinguishing between 
technical knowledge, processes, products, and experience, the explanatory 
value and power of technology as a variable cannot be fully realized. 
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Another problem that becomes apparent when examining the literature 
and recent research is its limited scope and generalizability. The range of 
existing empirical data is very limited. Those authors who have undertaken an 
extensive conceptualization of technology have typically failed to provide 
necessary empirical referents (e.g., Mannheim, Marcuse, Marx, Weinstein). On 
the other hand, there exist several rich ethnographic accounts of the impacts of 
technology in the workplace (e.g., Blauner, Garson, Shaiken, Zuboff). 
However, these accounts, though insightful, are context-bound to specific 
industries and to the realm of work in general. Many lack adequate 
conceptualization and operationalization of the topic, resulting in descriptions 
with little or limited historical and empirical value. 
Socio-technical change may have been driven by changes in the nature 
of work and production, but technological revolutions in the 1990s-a few of the 
most significant are in personal computers, micro-electronics, and information 
technology-have brought the impacts of technology out of the workplace and 
into the everyday secular experiences of social actors. With the proper 
conceptualization and operationalization, variables such as technology and its 
impacts can easily be generalized across the larger population. The obvious 
scope of the phenomenon suggests that such an attempt be undertaken. 
In sum, the existing literature lacks adequate and consistent 
conceptualization and operationalization of the topic. It is limited in scope and 
generalizability. It is somewhat biased toward ethnographic accounts in the 
workplace. Finally, it does not adequately address the extent and scope of the 
technological changes having occurred in recent years. 
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Conceptualization and Operationalization of Technology 
The literature illustrates how technology has historically been 
conceptualized in various, often divergent, ways. These include technical 
processes (e.g., assembly lines, numerical controls), technological products or 
artifacts (e.g., the automobile, computers), experiences of technology (e.g., 
future shock, information anxiety), and technological knowledge (i.e., know-
how). To facilitate explanation of how technology comes to be perceived as 
having negative impacts, an analytical model integrating these concepts may 
be constructed (see Figure 1 ). This dialectical approach treats technology first 
and foremost as a form of humanly constructed and maintained knowledge. 
This knowledge has dialectical moments as it becomes objectivated through 
the technical process and consequently takes the shape of products, materials, 
and other objective artifacts. When people lose track of the fact that these 
processes and products are human creations, it is called reification. 
Hypothetically, they then may tend to experience technology as an external 
autonomous force with coercive and constraining effects and/or negative 
consequences. Technology, thus, can be conceptualized as a form of humanly 
constructed knowledge with specific dialectical moments. 
Technology must be operationalized in terms of its dialectical moments. 
It is herein asserted that to treat technology solely as a process, product, or 
imposing experience reifies the concept. Thus, indicators must be developed 
that treat technology first and foremost as a body of knowledge. Such 
indicators would involve the possession of 11know-how11 and confidence in 
interacting with a rapidly changing material world. A person who recognizes 
that technology is a form of knowledge, for example, might disagree with the 
statement that 11technology is running away with itself.11 Another category of 
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indicators would involve human action, i.e., interaction with the technical-
material world. Examples of such indicators would be the use of technical 
products and processes to achieve desired ends. Using an ATM machine 
might fall under this operational category. The next set of indicators would 
involve specific products, artifacts, and materials. A material object must be 
present and recognizable for people to experience its effects and describe 
those experiences. Owning a personal computer might fall under this group of 
technological phenomena. The final set of indicators would involve the 
immediate experience of technical processes and products. Does a person 
indicate that her needs are met through interacting with technical process and 
products? Does she feel alienation? Does she perceive that she has no 
control over the outcome of her actions? Is her life objectively easier, or more 
complex, as a result of interacting with specific technological processes and 
products? By operationalizing technology as sets of indicators which reflect 
each dialectical moment of the concept, it becomes easier to explain the 
process in which gaps appear in the social dialectic, resulting in perceptions 
that the impacts of technology are negative and undesirable. This allows the 
researcher to explain the actual process in which technology yields certain 
social and psychological impacts. 
Given that the understanding, control, and accountability of technology 
is a desired goal, the value of a technology-as-knowledge approach is that it 
locates these moments within each individual. An admitted emancipatory 
agenda accompanies the way in which technology is operationalized herein. 
Consequently, it is proposed that any other way of operationalizing the concept 
exacerbates the reification process and ultimately creates gaps in the social 
dialectic from which negative perceptions of the phenomena might emerge. 
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Equally important, operationalizing technology as knowledge with specific 
dialectical moments can provide the necessary theoretical foundation for more 
meaningful empirical and quantitative models. This research proposal seeks to 
illustrate how such operationalization can yield meaningful, generalizable, 
empirical results. 
Hypotheses 
1 . People who define technology as knowledge perceive they have 
greater control over technological processes than people who tend to reify the 
concept. 
2. People who define technology as knowledge perceive they have 
greater control over technological products than people who tend to reify the 
concept. 
3. People who define technology as knowledge have fewer negative 
attitudes about technological processes than people who tend to reify the 
concept. 
4. People who define technology as knowledge have fewer negative 
attitudes about technological products than people who tend to reify the 
concept. 
5. People who define technology as knowledge are more receptive to 
technological change than people who tend to reify the concept. 
Definition of Terms 
To clarify the preceding hypotheses, certain phrases and terms may 
require additional operationalization. For the purposes of this proposal, the 
following terms will be defined and operationalized as such: 
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1. Technology-as-knowledge: Technology-as-knowledge relates 
specifically to know-how. A person who sees technology primarily as a form of 
knowledge will disagree with definitions which relate technology exclusively to 
technical processes or products. 
2. Negative attitudes: This is an umbrella term which will encompass all 
indicators that involve the perception that some aspect of technology is 
undesirable, problematic, dysfunctional, etc. People with negative attitudes 
concerning technology might indicate that 11technology is the cause of all our 
problems11 or that 11technology has made my life more difficult. 11 
3. Technological processes: In terms of a specific dialectical moment, 
technological processes refer to any specific human action which utilizes 
technological knowledge. 
4. Technological products: In terms of a specific dialectical moments, 
technological products will refer to any object or event which is an objective 
and observable result of a technological process. 
5. Reify: As defined in the review of the literature, to reify something is 
to give something an identity in absence of the human knowledge and actions 
which create and/or maintain it. Literally, reification means to 11make something 
thing-like/' i.e., treat human creations as 11things in themselves. 11 People who 
reify technology see it only as process or product and not as a form of humanly 
constructed and maintained knowledge. 
6. Control: For the purposes of this study, control will refer to the 
perception that one is intentionally acting, as opposed to only reacting, in a 
potentially interactive situation. People who perceive they have control over 
technological processes might disagree with a statement that they are 
11manipulated by machines at work. 11 People who perceive that they do not 
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have control over technological products might agree with a statement such as 
111 have not bought a personal computer because I probably couldn't learn how 
to run it. 11 
7. Receptive: Being receptive of something means maintaining a 
positive outlook, having an open mind, and hesitating to pre-judge the outcome 
of a situation. A person who is receptive to technological change will anticipate 
and look forward to new experiences with technological processes and 
products. It is a near-opposite to a negative attitude, and often involves 
elements of control. 
Method 
The methods and analyses suggested herein are intended to illustrate 
how a critical 11sociology of knowledge" approach to technology can be the 
foundation for empirical research. Ideally, these methods and analyses will be 
tested, refined, and evaluated before a large representative endeavor be 
undertaken. In light of this qualifier, to maximize generalizability, a national 
random-sample mail survey is suggested as the primary method of data 
collection. 
For the initial exploratory study a national random-sample mail survey 
will be administered to a target population of all households in the United 
States. The sample frame will be predetermined by a professional sampling 
corporation, e.g., Survey Sampling Inc. A random sample of 2000 households 
will then be professionally drawn and household addresses will be provided by 
the firm on computer disk and pre-printed mailing labels. This proposal will 
outline the method of administering an initial exploratory study of 2000 
households for the purpose of establishing a return rate, testing the survey 
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instrument, measuring indicator and item reliability, and determining the 
feasibility of a more comprehensive study. Note that alternative sampling 
methods could be used at the exploratory phase, e.g. stratified samplings of 
special interest groups, judgement samples, etc. 
An initial exploratory random-sample mail survey is suggested due to the 
fact that established return rates on national random-sample mailings are only 
12 to 15 percent. This estimate includes a probable 20 percent mobility rate. 
Thus, the exploratory study might yield up to 300 completed questionnaires. 
Proven instruments which target special interests in the general population can 
yield up to a 30 percent return rate. Pre-screening can also improve return 
rates and minimize the mobility problem, but cost-benefit ratios would need to 
be established in the exploratory phase. The exploratory study will test the 
instrument and identify special interest and population groups to which refined 
instruments could be administered at a later time with greatly improved return 
rates. Reliability analyses will be run on each indicator and item. Most 
importantly, the exploratory study will yield sufficient representative data to 
make generalizations about those segments of the population which 
responded to and returned the instrument. 
The sample instrument will include a cover letter, 3-page questionnaire, 
and a prepaid return envelope. The cover letter will identify the researchers, 
study, and provide necessary written instructions for completing and returning 
the instrument. The letter will request that a permanent household member, 
age 18 or over, complete and return the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire consists of 3 sections, each designed in an easy to 
understand self-directive graphical format. The first section deals with 
technological products with which the respondent might come in contact. The 
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section also includes a 5-point attitudinal scale for each product, allowing the 
respondent to rate the perceived quality of his or her experience with each 
potential product. The second section consists of statements about the 
respondent1s knowledge, actions, experiences, and perceptions concerning 
various technological issues, processes, and products. Each statement is 
followed by a standard 5 point Likert scale. The final section requests 
demographic information from the respondent, thanks him or her for her 
cooperation, and makes a final plea to return the questionnaire in the prepaid 
envelope. A draft of the questionnaire may be found in the appendix. 
Ideally, a list of 100 or more items would be developed from a wide 
range of potential indicators of technological knowledge, reification of 
knowledge, processes, products, experiences, attitudes, etc. This list would be 
subjected to a panel of reviewers to assess the potential strengths, 
representativeness, and reliability of each item. The sample questionnaire is 
intended to illustrate what an instrument utilizing these indicators might look 
like. 
The following tables are constructed to illustrate which variables in the 
sample questionnaire represent indicators of each dialectical moment of 
technology. Table 1 refers to specific technological products with which the 
respondent may have had experience. 
Table 1 
Sample Survey Items Indicating Utilization of Technological Products 
ATM (Bank Teller) Machine 
Home Shopping by Phone 
FAX Machine 
Mainframe Computer/Terminal 
VCR and/or Video Camera 
Nintendo/Other Game Machine 
CD or Laser Disk Player 
Personal Computer 
Phone Calling Card 
Computer Electronic Mail 
Banking by Telephone 
Cellular or Mobile Phone 
Computer BBS/Information Service 
Other (written in) 
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Accompanying the list of products in Table 1 would be scales for the number of 
times used and a Likert scale requesting the respondent to quantify the "quality 
of the experience" on a scale from 1 to 5. In one case, given that the 
assumptions of the statistics have been met, the quality of an experience could 
become a dependent variable in partial correlation or regression analyses. In 
another scenario, the use of technological products and the quality of the 
experience could become partial explanations for larger experiential variables 
such as perceptions of alienation, control, satisfaction, etc. 
Section 2 of the questionnaire also lists items which indicate 
assessments and attitudes about technological products. To achieve an 
optimal level of attitudinal measurement, each item would be followed by a 
standard 5 point Likert scale. Table 2 lists these items. 
Table 2 
Sample Survey Items Indicating Assessment of Technological Products 
Overall, technological products have made my life easier. 
I prefer doing business with real bank tellers and not ATM machines. 
I trust store clerks more than UPC bar code scanners. 
I am offended by telephone answering machines. 
Machines are more reliable than people. 
I feel helpless when it comes to computers. 
I prefer doing business in person as opposed to over the phone. 
Life would be better without so many machines. 
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Another set of indicators refers to technological processes-specifically, 
human actions, interactions, and assessments of actions-all of which require 
the utilization of technological knowledge. Inevitably, attitudes toward 
experiences of these processes become the actual variable being measured. 
Often these processes utilize or result in specific technological products. Table 
3 offers examples from the sample questionnaire which refer specifically to the 
technological process category of indicators. 
Table 3 
Sample Survey Items Indicating Assessments of Technological Processes 
My hobbies often include using mechanical or electronic gadgets. 
It's fun to assemble and set up a new toy, appliance, or device. 
The items in Table 3 are examples of indicators of attitudes relating to 
interaction with specific technological processes and requiring technological 
knowledge. 
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Likewise, a Likert scale could be utilized to quantify attitudes and 
experiences of technology without referring to specific processes and 
products. These indicators would refer to how people internalize or 
subjectivate technology as an objective phenomenon. Feelings of alienation, 
helplessness, and lack of control might be operationalized using these 
indicators. Table 4 offers examples of these items. 
Table 4 
Sample Survey Items Indicating Assessments of Experiences of Technology as 
an Objective Phenomenon 
I feel like technology controls my life. 
Modern technology has made the world too impersonal. 
New technology has given me more control over my work. 
New technologies have made the world too complicated. 
I don't have to work as hard as a result of new technologies. 
I could be replaced by a machine someday. 
I feel limited in my abilities and potentials because of new technologies. 
The indicators illustrated by Table 4 could be considered as dependent 
variables in hypotheses testing and statistical model building. Regardless of 
whether the dependent variables are specific processes, products, or an 
assessment of the experience of technology in general, the important 
independent variable must be technological knowledge and its subsequent 
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potential to be reified. Indicators of the reification of technological knowledge 
are discussed in the next section. 
Suggestions for Data Analyses 
Few assumptions about the representativeness of the population or the 
effective reliability of the indicators and instrument can be made at this time. 
The tentative nature of the data acquired in the initial exploratory study 
suggests that simple descriptive measures be run on each variable. These 
would describe the scope of modern technology and its impacts. Given that 
the nature of the population and data meet the necessary assumptions, 
comparisons of sample means such as t-tests and its derivatives could be used 
to compare groups of responses to specific items. If the nature of the working 
population does not lend itself to parametric measures, nonparametric 
measures such as chi-sqaure and the Wilcoxon ranked means test could be 
utilized to compare group responses to items of interest. 
Once the instrument is refined, reliable indicators established, and a true 
representative sample is acquired, parametric measures could be utilized in 
constructing other significant measures of association and dependence, e.g., 
correlations, partial correlations, and multiple linear regression models. 
Since the research question suggests that the reification of technology is 
at the base of negative perceptions about technology, assumptions about 
independence focus on indicators of the reification of technological knowledge. 
The operationalization of the variable 11reification of technological knowledge 11 
involves developing indicators which clearly demonstrate that respondents 
identify technology as 11a thing in itself' existing outside of the knowledge and 
actors which create and maintain it. The following statements (see Table 5) 
from Section 2 on the exploratory questionnaire are examples of intended 
indicators of the reification of technological knowledge: 
Table 5 
Sample Survey Items Indicating the Reification of Technological Knowledge 
Technology is running away with itself. 
I am sure technology will eventually destroy the world. 
If anything can solve the world's problem's, technology can. 
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When linking the indicators in Table 5 to the conceptual model and approach 
presented in Figure 1, indicators of the reification of technological knowledge 
might then be thought of as independent variables upon which to build 
empirical analyses. 
For the purposes of quantitative analysis, a dependent variable would be 
anything which refers to attitudes toward specific technical processes, 
products, or particular experiences with these processes and products. 
Section 1 on the exploratory questionnaire deals with several technological 
products and requests a subjective assessment of the experience with each 
product. Section 2 also deals with the experience of technological products, in 
addition to subjective assessments of intended human action and various 
technical processes (see Appendix for specific examples). Some responses 
are clearly negative while others are clearly positive. After recoding the data so 
that all negative (anti-technology) responses reflect low scores and all positive 
(pro-technology) responses have high scores, multidimensional scaling could 
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offer insights into the degree that the reification of technology is associated with 
negative perceptions concerning technology. At-test would indicate whether 
the mean scores for each group of indicators are a simple product of chance or 
not. Once the preconditional assumptions have been met, a statistical multiple 
linear regression model could be constructed which may or may not 
complement the analytical model upon which the study is founded. Such a 
model would explain negative attitudes and experiences with technology using 
the reification of technology (see Table 5) as an independent variable. The 
utilization of products and processes (see Tables 1, 2, & 3) could be treated as 
intervening variables in specific attitudinal outcomes from Table 4. Alternatively, 
the utilization of processes and products could also be thought of as outcomes 
in themselves with technological knowledge as the independent variable. Both 
approaches could be utilized and the groups later compared. Generally, the 
items in Table 4 can be treated as attitudinal outcomes to be explained. 
The purpose of this proposal is to suggest how a more comprehensive 
operationalizatlon of technology can lead to meaningful empirical research. As 
a result of these efforts, a better and more comprehensive description of the 
everyday phenomena of technology can be realized. In addition, technology's 
relationship to other social phenomena can be explored with the aspiration of 
better understanding human behavior and social phenomena. 
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CONCLUSION 
Several agendas and layers of analysis have been pursued throughout 
this thesis. As stated earlier, the two major purposes of the work include (a) 
the development and application of a more comprehensive socio-technological 
model (see Figure 1) as a foundation for empirical analysis, and (b) to suggest 
an empirical direction in exploring the complex interrelationships of technology 
and society. Antecedent to both of these primary objectives is the need to 
develop a better understanding of technology as a concept itself. A review of 
the literature suggests that technology has historically been poorly 
conceptualized and operationalized, thus negating its empirical and 
explanatory value. By combining ideas from the Critical School of sociology, 
the sociology of knowledge, and existing empirical data, a more 
comprehensive understanding of technology can be developed. 
The critical agenda is clear. People appear to be increasingly 
concerned and disenchanted with the negative impacts of technology. A good 
deal of the empirical work cited illustrates how technology can be used to 
oppress people and restructure society to the benefit of an elitist few. The bias 
herein is the assertion that this technological oppression must be abated. The 
agenda is that this might be achieved through a better understanding of 
technology itself-how it becomes reified and people come to blame 
technology for their problems instead of placing accountability in the hands of 
the people who are wielding the initial technological knowledge. The 
advantage of the sociology of knowledge approach is that it locates technology 
first and foremost in the individual, thus minimizing potential reification and 
maximizing technological responsibility and accountability. 
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Another layer of analysis deals with the shortcomings of the sociology of 
knowledge and social dialectics. Rightfully so, these areas of sociology have 
been criticized for being 11too metaphysical" and "lacking in empirical referents. 11 
The method of presentation throughout the thesis was intended to suggest that 
an empirical approach to the synthesis of the traditional subject-object, action-
experience dichotomies is possible and desirable. Technology is a relatively 
unique phenomenon in that it is irrefutably contingent upon all these dialectical 
moments. It is a form of knowledge, requires human action to be implemented, 
takes on specific and identifiable objective forms, and requires the continual 
reinterpretation and reformulation of knowledge to be maintained. It is a 
household word, readily identified or experienced, yet often misunderstood. 
Technology may be the ideal variable to illustrate the utility of the sociology of 
knowledge and a dialectical approach to social reality. In doing so, these 
approaches clearly take on more substantive and less metaphysical properties. 
The macro-micro rift is indirectly addressed through the method of 
presentation. The macro aspect of technological phenomena becomes 
apparent in the institutionalization of knowledge. Science, sociology, and 
technology became artificially separate, distinct, rationalized, bureaucratized, 
and commodified bodies of knowledge in the emerging macro social structure 
of post-enlightenment Europe and the United States. This inevitably affected 
the outcomes of what was perceived to be large scale social-scientific progress 
(both Marx and Weber refuted this conception of progress). On the micro 
level, people came to treat these bodies of knowledge as discrete, thus failing 
to see how changes in one area inevitably affects change in all the others. In 
addition, the fact remains that we cannot experience the environment in small 
rational chunks arbitrarily defined as scientific, technological, social, etc. This 
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macro-micro rift, involving the bureaucratization and rationalization of 
knowledge at the macro level, and the fragmentation of knowledge, action, and 
experience at the micro level, leads to another potential gap in the social 
dialectic. 
Some of the criticisms and shortcomings of critical theory are indirectly 
addressed. Like the sociology of knowledge, critical theory has been criticized 
for its lack of empirical referents. If one accepts the assertion that empirically 
valid and reliable research must be theoretically grounded and interpreted, 
critical theory can be just as useful as any other approach in providing a 
framework for research construction, data collection, and subsequent analyses. 
If technology is the variable under study, critical theory may be even more 
useful due to the fact that it is the only approach which has extensively 
addressed the impacts and consequences of technology. Critical theory has 
empirical applications. This thesis attempts to illustrate one example of such 
an application. 
Finally, as Garson (1988}, Mayr (1986), Zuboff (1988), and many others 
pointed out, information and electronic technology have far reaching effects; 
the impacts and consequences may be as significant as the coming of the 
industrial revolution itself. Although the literal concept of the 11post-industrial 
society11 may never be actually realized, social and cultural reality definitely take 
on different shapes and characteristics in light of information and electronic 
technologies. The rate of social change is increasing exponentially. 
Technology facilitates, if not precipitates, this rate of change. There is 
something important going on here that has been largely neglected in past 
sociological research. It is time that sociological researchers focused more 
attention on technology as an explanatory variable in sociological studies. 
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(1) Place an "X" by each item you have used in the last 12 months. 
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(2) For each of those items, fill in the blanks with the number of times you have used each item 
in that time. 
(3) Place an "X" by the items you have used at work or in connection with your employment. 
(4) Finally, rate the quality of the experience on a scale from 1 to 5 from "1 • being a "very bad 
experience" to a "5" representing a "very good experience.• Circle only one number and do not 
mark between or outside of the boxes. 
Experiences with Electronic and Information Technology 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mark an 'X' if Fill in the number Mark an 'X' (Circle only one number) 
you have ITEM of times you have if the item is 1 =Very bad experience 
used the used the item in one you use 2=Somehat bad experience 
item in the the past 12 at work. 3=Neutral 
past 12 months. 4=Somewhat good experience 
months. 5=Very good experience 
~TM (Bank Teller) Machine 1 2 3 4 5 
Home Shopping by Phone 1 2 3 4 5 
FAX Machine 1 2 3 4 5 
Mainframe Computer/Terminal 1 2 3 4 5 
VCR and/or Video Camera 1 2 3 4 5 
Nintendo/Other Game Machine 1 2 3 4 5 
CD or Laser Disk Player 1 2 3 4 5 
Personal Computer 1 2 3 4 5 
Phone Calling Card 1 2 3 4 5 
Computer Electronic Mail 1 2 3 4 5 
Banking by Telephone 1 2 3 4 5 
Cellular or Mobile Phone 1 2 3 4 5 
Computer BBS/Information Service 1 2 3 4 5 
(Write in any other electronic/ 1 2 3 4 5 
information/technological device): 
(Write in any other electronic/ 1 2 3 4 5 
information/technological device): 





Read each of the following statements and circle the number which best describes 
your feelings about the statement. Circle only one number for each statement. Do not mark 
between or outside of the boxes. Do not try to change the statements or possible responses 
as this will invalidate the item. Use the following number key for your responses: 
1 = I Strongly Disagree 
2 = I Somewhat Disagree 
3 = I am Neutral 
4 = I Somewhat Agree 
5 = I Strongly Agree 
STATEMENTS Disagree / Agree 
1. Overall, new technological products have made my life alot easier. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I feel like technology controls my life. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Modern technology has made the world too impersonal. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Technology seems to be running away with itself. 1 2 3 4 5 
5, I prefer doing business with real bank tellers and not ATM machines. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. I am sure technology will eventually destroy the world. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. New technology has given me more control over my work. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. New technologies have made the world too complicated. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. I trust store clerks more than UPC bar code scanners. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. My hobbies often include using mechanical or electronic gadgets. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. I am offended by telephone answering machines. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. I don't have to work as hard as a result of new technologies. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. It's fun to assemble and set up a new toy, appliance, or device. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Machines are more reliable than people. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. I feel helpless when it comes to computers. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. I prefer doing business in person as opposed to over the phone. 1 2 3 4 5 
17. Life would be better without so many machines. 1 2 3 4 5 
18. I could be replaced by a machine someday. 1 2 3 4 5 
19. I feel limited in my abilities and potential because of new technologies. 1 2 3 4 5 
20. If anything can solve the world's problems, technology can. 1 2 3 4 5 





Your household is one of several thousand which has been drawn at random by 
computer to receive this questionnaire. To guarantee that this study is truly based on a 
random sample we require demographic information from each household. Your name or 
address is not associated with this information and you can be assured that any personal 
information you provide will remain strictly confidential. Please answer the following questions 
as accurately as possible. Mark an "X" in the box next to the correct answer for each item 
unless instructed to do otherwise. 
Background Information 
1. Gender 
(Check one) Femalec=J 
Malec=] 

















(write in job title) 
Place of Residence 
by population 
{check one) 








5. Your age at your last birthday • 
(write in number of years) 
6. Highest year of school 
you have completed • 
(write in number of years) 
7. Total$ Household Income 
(Check one) 





50,000 and up 
8. Number of dependents 
under age 18 in household • 
(write in number of children) 
9. Number of adults age 18 
or over living in household • 
(write in number of adults) 
1 o. Please write in your name, 
phone number, and a time 
you can be reached if you 
are willing to consent to a 
telephone interview. 
(check for a phone interview) C:=J 
Name _______ _ 
Phone( )_-__ _ 
Best time to call __ AM/PM 
Thank you for your time and input. Please return this questionnaire in the pre-paid envelope 
right away. Your responses are greatly appreciated and will remain confidential. 
* Some items have been proportionally reduced or altered to meet thesis margin requirements. 
